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Companies and indeed governments all over the world have tried to secure the 
future of their employees by setting up pension schemes (Wallace 2002). 
However, pension contributions might become a huge unbearable expenditure 
for some organizations, as this presentation will show. While initially most 
companies willing to set up a pension scheme would almost always regard the 
Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Scheme as the scheme of first choice, the trend 
has since changed (Ross and Wills 2002) over the years. Possible causes 
responsible for this shift in focus are many (Twinney 1995). The shift could have 
contributed to some companies sponsoring Defined Benefit schemes to have a 
rethink on which type of pension scheme to operate. 
Zambezi River Authority is a quasi-government entity operating in both Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. It set up a DB pension scheme for its employees in 1987 and has 
not been spared from this pressure to re-examine its pension fund. In recent 
years the Zambezi River Authority Pension Scheme has recorded huge shortfalls 
(Zambezi River Authority Pension Scheme Accounts 1999 to 2004). This has 
resulted in the employer struggling to pay up his pension obligations. Sooner or 
later, if nothing is done, the pension scheme will probably not be able to meet the 
objectives for which it was set up. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate and discuss the problems being faced 
by the Zambezi River Authority Pension Scheme. The paper outlines the different 
types of pension funds and compares them with the type of fund the Zambezi 
River Authority operates. 
The results of this study show that while the benefit structure of the Zambezi 
River Authority Pension Fund could have been relevant at the time the fund was 
set up, circumstances have substantially changed from what they were then. It is 
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argued in the study that if no action is taken, the Zambezi River Authority 
Pension Scheme is likely to collapse. 
It is recommended in the study that the Zambezi River Authority Pension 
Scheme should be changed from a Defined Benefit Scheme to a Defined 
Contribution Scheme. It is also recommended that the management of the 
scheme should be changed and that the scheme should invest in portfolios that 
bring positive returns. Above all, it is recommended that members should take a 
more active role in the affairs of their pension scheme. 
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1.1 Chapter 1 Introduction and Problem Statement 
1.2 Background 
Corporate pension schemes have been in existence since the nineteenth century 
but it was only after the Second World War that they became widely adopted 
(Fox 2006). Apart from attracting and retaining skilled workers it became 
fashionable and a show of social responsibility for Western governments and 
companies to set up pension schemes for their employees (Wallace 2002). State 
pension schemes were predominantly pay as you go schemes, which were not 
backed by any assets or investments while private pension schemes were mainly 
Defined Benefit (DB) schemes (Blake 2000). 
In recent years some private company pension schemes have recorded 
substantial pension shortfalls on their DB pension schemes. According to a 
survey conducted by Watson Wyatt in 2003, the percentage of employers with 
fully funded pension schemes in the US declined from 84% in 1998 to 37% in 
2002 (http://watsonwyatt.com/news). The same survey reports that at the end 
of 2000 General Motors reported a shortfall of US$19,3 billion on its DB pension 
scheme. As a result of these shortfalls, companies sponsoring DB schemes have 
been forced to prop up the schemes by putting in additional funding. Reasons for 
the emergence of pension shortfalls vary from country to country and 
organization-to-organization. It would seem that DB pension schemes may need 
additional funding other than normal pension contributions, from the sponsor 
organization. Questions have, however, been asked as to the sustainability of 
pension funds that require to be periodically bailed out by the sponsoring 
organization. Indeed some organizations like Zambezi River Authority are 
struggling to meet shortfalls on their DB pension schemes as this paper shows. 
The financing of Pension Funds can constitute a huge financial burden for 
companies (Fox 2006). It may be financially crippling where the sponsoring 
organisation is periodically called upon to put in additional funding to meet 
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shortfalls arising. However, companies would have failed in their social 
responsibility duties if they were unable or unwilling to provide reasonable 
pension benefits to their employees. Therefore, in structuring a pension scheme, 
organisations need to strike a balance between the financial security needs of 
their employees at retirement and the cost to the organization of financing such a 
pension scheme. 
There are two main types of pension schemes: the Defined Benefit (DB) Scheme 
and the Defined Contribution (DC) Scheme. Initially, it was the Defined Benefit 
pension schemes which were dominating. The trend is, however, changing with 
the coming on stream of the DC schemes (Blake 2000). Wallace (2002) argues 
that when they were set up, defined benefit pension schemes could have had 
their merits but have now outlived those merits and are no longer relevant for 
today's aging populations in the West and in Japan. Since the structure of these 
pension schemes may now be irrelevant to present day circumstances, they 
need to be reformed to survive. Governments and companies throughout the 
world have realised the cost implications of Defined Benefit Pension Schemes 
and have embarked on various reforms, some of which could be defined as 
radical (Wallace 2002). 
The reasons why DB schemes are recording pension shortfalls are many 
(Twinney 1995). While the greatest threats in the West could be the benefit 
structure and the aging population (Watson Wyatt), in poor countries such as 
Zimbabwe the major problems could be different. The Zimbabwe Association of 
Pension Funds, in their bulletin (2003), identified galloping inflation as the 
greatest threat to pension schemes in Zimbabwe. Other causes of pension 
shortfalls are the benefit structure, limited investment options and, lack of 
investment expertise as this paper shows. 
In order to financially secure the retirement of its employees, Zambezi River 
Authority (ZRA), set up what is now known as the Zambezi River Authority 
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Pension Fund. ZRA came into being in 1987 following the reconstruction of its 
predecessor, the Central African Power Corporation. The Authority's main 
function is to ensure the effective use of the waters and other resources of the 
Zambezi River and more specifically that part of the river, common to the borders 
of the two states (Zambezi River Authority Act Article 9 (a) of the laws of Zambia 
and Zimbabwe). The Zambezi River Authority, amongst other functions was 
given the mandate to recruit and employ staff necessary for the discharge of its 
responsibilities (Zambezi River Authority Act Article 9(h) of the laws of Zambia 
and Zimbabwe). It is this provision, which also requires the Zambezi River 
Authority to maintain a pension scheme for all its permanent employees. In order 
to fulfill the obligation, the Central African Power Corporation (now Zambezi River 
Authority) established an internally administered Pension Fund in 1978. 
Following the re-construction of the Central African Power Corporation, the fund 
is now known as the Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund. 
Initially, membership to the pension scheme was open only to senior employees 
(CAPCO Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 8 (1) (a)). However, 
from July 1993 it became a condition of employment that all permanent 
employees of Zambezi River Authority had to be members of the ZRA Pension 
Fund upon joining ZRA (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 8 
(2)). Since ZRA has offices in the two states of Zimbabwe and Zambia, it 
operates two pension schemes, one for Zambian and the other for Zimbabwean 
nationals. This study will focus on the pension scheme set up for the 
Zimbabwean nationals. 
According to the ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 17 (1) 
both the employee and the employer are obliged to make monthly contributions 
to the Fund. Since the Fund is a Defined Benefit Fund, any shortfall that may 
arise is the responsibility of the employer, ZRA (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance 
Fund Rules Section 17 (3)). It is therefore paramount that the contributions by the 
employees and the employer are invested in high yielding investment portfolios if 
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the employer is to avoid having to periodically put in additional money into the 
Fund. To what extent this can be achieved in a hyper-inflationary environment 
like Zimbabwe is debatable. 
Just like some DB schemes elsewhere in the world, the ZRA pension scheme 
has recorded pension shortfalls in recent years. Consequently, the sponsoring 
employer, ZRA, has been called upon to put in additional funding in the pension 
scheme so that the fund is able to meet its obligations. However, such additional 
funding has become a strain on ZRA and indications are that ZRA cannot afford 
to continually bail out the scheme for too long. 
The ZRA pension scheme is a self-administered scheme. A Principal Officer who 
is a full-time employee of the Zambezi River Authority administers the pension 
scheme (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 4(2)). The 
scheme has a Board of Trustees consisting of five officials, which supervises the 
administration of the scheme (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules 
Section 4(2)). 
1.2 Motivation for Research 
The Central African Power Corporation, the predecessor of Zambezi River 
Authority, set up a pension fund in 1978. The Pension Fund was set up as a 
Defined Benefit Pension Scheme where the benefit to be paid out at retirement is 
defined (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 9 (9)). In this type 
of pension scheme, employees receive pension benefits that are linked to their 
final salary and the period they would have served the sponsoring employer. The 
organization bears the risk that investment returns may not perform to 
expectations. 
The Fund was set up when the economy of Zimbabwe was still stable with 
inflation in single digits i.e. 8.1 percent per annum (Central Statistics Office, 
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Zimbabwe). The members of the pension scheme were very few, with relatively 
low salaries and fewer years in service than is the case at present (CAPCO and 
ZRA Annual Accounts). Membership to the Pension Scheme was not mandatory 
and as such only a few members joined the Scheme. The organization then 
could therefore afford to sponsor the pension scheme with ease. In fact, when 
the pension scheme was established, no contributions were required from 
members as the employer was taking care of everything (CAPCO Pension and 
Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 17 (1). 
Things however changed, first in 1993 when it became a condition of 
employment for all employees to become members of the Zambezi River 
Authority Pension Scheme (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules 
Section 8 (2)). This meant a dramatic increase in the number of members and as 
such more contributions into the pension scheme from the employer. As early as 
1995, an actuary who was engaged to assess the financial soundness of the 
Pension Fund recommended that ZRA should increase its funding of the pension 
fund by almost three times (Watson Wyatt 1995, p. 8). The actuary, while 
acknowledging that the funding level on an ongoing basis (that is the value of the 
assets expressed as a percentage of liabilities allowing for future salary 
increases) was one hundred and two percent (102%) (Watson Wyatt 1995, p. 6), 
still recommended that the employer should increase his contributions. 
According to another actuarial report by Pentact Limited (2004), the funding level 
of ZRA Pension Fund had gone down from one hundred and two percent (102%) 
of the past service liabilities at 31 December, 2000 to seventy-two (72%) as at 31 
December, 2002. Yet another actuarial valuation, carried out by Pentact Limited 
as at 30 June, 2004 showed that the funding level had even dropped further to 
twenty-two percent (22.2%) of the past service liabilities. 
Alarm bells started ringing as the sustainability of the fund was now questionable. 
It became clear that the state of affairs of the pension fund called for some urgent 
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action to stop the trend and thereby prevent an imminent collapse of the ZRA 
Pension Fund. Questions were then asked as to whether the benefit structure 
was appropriate, whether the contributions were realistic, the returns adequate 
and above all, whether the pension scheme needed to be revamped to make it 
sustainable. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The level of funding that is required to be put into DB type pension schemes to 
keep them afloat could be substantial, as ZRA found out. It would seem that ZRA 
is not coping with the financial demands placed upon it by the ZRA Pension 
Fund. Time may have come to ask the question whether the benefit structure of 
the ZRA Pension Fund is sustainable. Other questions that are pertinent to the 
debate are: 
• Apart from the benefit structure what other factors could be contributing to 
the shortfalls? Is the pension fund being properly managed? Are 
contributions levels adequate? Are the investment portfolios of the fund 
balanced? 
• What are the global trends in the structure and funding of pension funds? 
• How can the fund be saved from collapse for the benefit of the members 
who are present-day employees of Zambezi River Authority? 
The research will also try to show that problems being faced by ZRA in funding 
its pension scheme are not unique to ZRA or indeed Zimbabwe but are common 
even in developed countries, with all their financial muscles. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The study aims to provide a researched solution to the problems being faced in 
the running of the ZRA Pension Fund by analyzing the following: 
• The benefit structure of the ZRA pension Fund 
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• The adequacy of contributions being made to the fund by both the 
members and the employer 
• How the fund is being managed and its financial performance 
The study concludes with recommendations on what could be done to make sure 
the ZRA Pension Fund continues to meet the objectives for which it was set up. 
1.5 Limitations of the Project 
Due to time and financial constraints, some of the methodologies and techniques 
which could have been employed to show the effects various factors had on the 
ZRA Pension Fund could not be employed in this research. Some of the reasons 
behind the poor performance of the Pension Fund could be qualitative and 
therefore their impact cannot be quantitatively measured. The inflation rates and 
exchange rates to be used are official versions while the unofficial rates could be 
much higher. This is particularly so in Zimbabwe where at times the official 
prices (where goods and services may not be available) do not in any way relate 
to the prices in the parallel market where goods and services are available. 
1.6 Brief Outline of the Study 
Using the Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund as a reference, the study aims 
to show how unsustainable it has become for companies in general, and those 
operating in Zimbabwe in particular, to sponsor a Defined Benefit Pension 
Scheme. The study will end by making recommendations on what is needed for 
ZRA to operate a sustainable pension scheme. 
The first chapter of this paper focuses on the background to the research, the 
motivation and the problem statement. The second chapter dwells on the review 
of literature on the structure of pension funds. This chapter discusses various 
types of retirement pension funds and the advantages and disadvantages of 
each, problems being faced in funding them and the global trends in the 
architecture and financing of pension funds. 
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Chapter Three outlines the research methodology that was employed in the 
collection and analysis of data. The fourth chapter presents the research results 
obtained. More specifically, the chapter gives a brief background of the sponsor 
of the ZRA Pension Fund, details about the fund, membership, administration 
and the financial performance of the fund over a nine-year period. The chapter 
also gives some statistics on the kind of environment the ZRA Pension Fund 
operates in. 
Detailed discussions of the results are done in Chapter Five. The chapter 
examines the implications of the Defined Benefit promise, the choice of the 
fund's investments and how the fund's investments have performed over the 
years in comparison with other investment portfolios available and in comparison 
with inflation and increases in salaries and benefits to members. The chapter will 
also look at the contribution rates and how these have affected the performance 
of the fund. Finally in Chapter Six, the study concludes by recommending how 
the Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund can be restructured, managed and 
funded so that it can continue to meet the objectives for which it was set up. 
1.7 Conclusion 
From the foregoing it is evident the ZRA Pension Fund is experiencing some 
problems which need to be resolved. Literature is available in abundance 
showing that the problems the ZRA Pension Fund is experiencing are not unique. 
The next chapter dwells on the problems other pension funds in selected 
countries are experiencing and how they have dealt or are dealing with the 
problems. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
According to a report by the World Bank (2005) entitled "Pensions in The Middle 
East and North Africa, Time to Change" 
(http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org), funding of pension schemes has 
become a topical issue not only in the developed world but through out the world. 
Concerns have been raised on the sustainability of Defined Benefit Pension 
Schemes and the implications this has on members of the pension schemes. As 
a result, the last two decades have seen wide ranging transformation of the 
private pension schemes (Mitchell 2000). Indeed, many factors affecting pension 
schemes have changed over the years. Some such factors include rising life 
expectancy, the regulatory environment and the rise and fall of world stock 
markets. All these factors and more have transformed the pension environment. 
In order to have an understanding of the subject under review, this chapter gives 
background information on pension funds; what they are, the main types of 
pension schemes, their merits and demerits. The chapter outlines the broad 
perspective of problems being faced in funding pension schemes. The chapter 
also gives an outline of the global trends on how pension schemes are being 
financed and the underlying reasons responsible for the trends. The chapter 
shows in brief how some companies in selected countries have dealt with 
problems being encountered in the financing of their pension schemes. The 
literature review will act as a reference point of how the ZRA Pension Fund may 
need to be restructured and managed so that it survives the problems it is 
currently facing. The chapter concludes by noting lessons that could be learnt by 
the ZRA pension fund. 
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2.2 Pension Fund Definition 
Pension Funds can be described as "systematic arrangements or plans governed 
by a set of rules whereby an individual member or an individual member and 
their employer periodically contribute some money into a "savings basket" or a 
"retirement fund for a specified period" (Choruma 2005, p. 2). The periodic 
contributions could be monthly, quarterly or any period that could be deemed to 
be convenient for the members and the employer. As contributions are made, 
they are invested in various asset types to make some investment returns 
(Mitchell 2000). The returns, when added together with the contributions overtime 
are paid in the form of pension benefits to a member who would have retired or 
to a surviving beneficiary in the event of a member's death. The pension benefits 
to be paid may or may not be related to what a member would have contributed 
(Choruma 2005). 
Membership to a pension scheme can either be voluntary or mandatory. 
Pension schemes can be funded or not funded, like most state pension schemes 
(Blake 2000). The schemes can either be sponsored by a single employer or by 
more than one employer. The pension funds can be financed internally or put in a 
separate pension fund that invests in investment options, which are external to 
the sponsoring organization (Wallace 2002). Examples of pension schemes 
include retirement annuity plans, individual pension plans, preservation funds 
and group pension plans (Choruma 2005). The focus of this study will however, 
be on group pension plans. 
The principal objective of a pension plan is to provide decent and secure 
retirement and other benefits to members once they leave employment or to help 
beneficiaries in the event of a member's death. There are basically two main 
types of pension plans; defined benefit pension plans and defined contribution 
plans (Twinney1995), whose merits and demerits are discussed below. 
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2.3 Defined Benefit (DB) Scheme 
A defined benefit pension scheme, as the name implies, is a pension scheme 
where the pension benefits to be paid to members are defined in some way. The 
pension to be paid out is based on some known formula, usually related to a 
member's length of service to the organization and his/her earnings (Bezooyen 
1997). Under the DB scheme, the pension benefit to be paid out is neither related 
to the amount contributed by the member and/or employer nor to the investment 
return of such contributions. The focus under the DB scheme is the pension 
benefit to be paid out to the members and not the contributions (Li 2003). It 
therefore means that the employer bears the risk that investments of the fund 
may not meet with expectations of returns. 
There is a popular DB scheme known in the UK as the occupational final salary 
scheme (Blake 2000). Under this scheme, the employee/member may be 
promised a percentage or a fraction, say 1/55, of his salary at retirement for each 
year of service completed. Another variation of the DB scheme is where 
members are promised an annuity based on the final average pay. Under this 
arrangement members may be promised a percentage of the highest average 
pay multiplied by the number of years served (Wallace 2002). 
One feature of the DB scheme is that members would earn the most valuable 
benefits in the later years of their working lives. This is so because benefits under 
the DB schemes are calculated with reference to the highest pay earned which in 
most, if not all cases, is earned in the employee's final years of service (Wallace 
2002). When an employee's pay increases, this causes an automatic increase to 
the benefits payable to a member even for the period one would have served the 
organization prior to the increment. 
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2.3.1 Advantages 
• Defined benefit pension plans provide guaranteed income security to 
workers after their retirement, it does not matter how the pension fund 
performs. 
• Employees do not carry the investment risk, as pension benefits do not 
depend on the contributions by the members, they depend on the 
employer's contribution. 
• DB schemes can provide some cost of living adjustments and pension 
formulas that are tied to the highest paid years which protect employees 
from the effects of inflation. 
2.3.2 Disadvantages 
• Where investments perform better than expected, members do not benefit 
as benefits are paid on the basis of a pre-determined formula. Instead, the 
employer benefits in the form of reduced contribution rates in future. 
• Funding DB schemes could be costly to the employer where inflation and 
salaries increase more than expected or where the return on investments 
does not meet with expectations. 
• The cost to the employer, of providing a DB scheme is not known in 
advance, it fluctuates according to the funding level of the scheme as such 
makes planning difficult. 
• It is administratively arduous as benefits to each individual member have 
to be tracked. 
• Under DB schemes, those who leave the sponsoring employer early lose 
out whereas those who stay do well. 
• DB schemes are not portable once an employee leaves the sponsoring 
employer membership ceases. 
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There is one form of defined benefit scheme, which deserves mention, the pay 
as you go pension scheme, which will be considered separately below. 
2.3.3 Pay as you go (PAYG) Schemes 
This is basically a form of defined benefit scheme, whereby the pension to be 
paid out is defined in some way. The difference with the traditional DB scheme is 
that they are not funded instead current pension benefits are paid from current 
contributions. This type of pension scheme is popular with state pension 
schemes (Blake 2000). Under the PAYG scheme, pension benefits of retired 
employees are paid from pension contributions of current employees. For the 
scheme to be viable in the long term it requires sufficient employees making 
adequate contributions to pay for the pension of those who would have retired 
(Blake 2000). The PAYG scheme was popular amongst developed countries 
after the Second World War and as of 2002 it was the biggest source of pension 
benefits in the developed world (Wallace 2002). 
The advantages and disadvantages of the ordinary DB scheme apply to the 
PAYG scheme as well. One peculiar feature of the PAYG pension scheme is that 
it is premised on the assumption of a growing population, without which it is not 
viable. 
2.4 Defined Contribution (DC) Schemes 
A Defined Contribution Pension Scheme is defined by The US Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) as a plan which has an 
individual account for each member of the scheme and for benefits based only 
on the amount contributed to the member's account and any income (Iwry 2002). 
Deriving from the above definition, the following are the features of a DC 
scheme: 
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• Though the pension scheme is treated as one, each member has an 
individual account created for him/her. 
• As member or member and employer contributions are periodically made 
they are credited to the member's individual account. 
• At the end of each year/period, members' accounts are debited and 
credited with member's forfeitures and shares of the scheme's investment 
return respectively. 
• All assets in the scheme are allocated to an account maintained for each 
individual member. 
The two most common defined contribution schemes are the money purchase 
scheme and the profit sharing scheme. Under the money purchase scheme, the 
company contributes a fixed percentage of members' salaries whereas under the 
profit sharing scheme the company contributes a percentage of profits during 
profitable years but it makes no contributions during unprofitable years (Li 2003). 
2.4.1 Advantages 
• The cost (to the employer) of providing a pension is known in advance as 
it does not fluctuate. 
• The benefit to members is not limited by some formula as long as the fund 
performs, members will receive all the returns. 
• DC schemes are portable; accumulation of benefits does not depend on a 
members staying with the same employer through out their working 
careers. 
• The members are in control of their investments. 
• Certain DC schemes can provide for loans to be made to members 
against the accumulated entitlements. 
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2.4.2 Disadvantages 
• Pension benefits to members are not guaranteed as they depend on the 
performance of the fund's investments. 
• DC schemes do not make provision for subsidies for employees who may 
opt for early retirement. 
• The scheme places the responsibility of investment decisions on members 
some of whom may not have the expertise in investments. 
2.5 Global Trends and Reasons Behind them 
The last two decades have witnessed tremendous changes not only in state 
pension schemes but in private pension schemes as well (Mitchell 2000). 
Initially, companies willing to set up a pension scheme for their workforce would 
almost always regard the Defined Benefit Pension Scheme as the scheme of first 
choice, but the trend has since changed in a number of countries (Ross and Wills 
2002). Throughout the world there appears to be a discernable shift away from 
DB pension schemes to DC schemes. Blake (2000) reports that about eighty-five 
percent of new schemes being established in the UK are DC schemes. Watson 
Wyatt (2002) also reports that in 1979 two thirds of workers with pension 
coverage were under the DB plans but by 1998 only one third of those workers 
were covered under the DB scheme. The reasons for the shift away from DB 
pension schemes are varied. The following paragraphs detail the reasons behind 
the trend. 
2.6 Reasons behind the Trends 
Possible causes of the move away from DB to DC schemes are many. Some of 
the causes are common to many countries while others are peculiar to certain 
countries. 
Wallace (2002) argues that the PAYG and DB Schemes were established during 
a time when poverty amongst the elderly was of concern and for this reason, its 
reduction and income redistribution was paramount in the design of DB schemes. 
Wallace (2002) further argues that there was a baby boom when PAYG pension 
schemes were established, but there has since been a baby bust of the 1970's, 
which puts paid to the assumption that there will always be more people in 
employment than there will be in retirement. Since the two schemes were 
designed, the world has significantly changed. 
Fox (2006) also argues that the DB pension scheme was designed in the 1950's 
when it was paramount for industry to retain employees with skills, which were 
specific to their manufacturing industries. However since then manufacturing has 
lost ground to the service industry whose skill requirements span across 
companies (Watson Wyatt 2002). 
One of the reasons partly responsible for the shift from the DB schemes is that 
the DB schemes generally favour employees who remain with the same 
employer throughout their working lives. This is so because the final salary 
schemes have a retrospective effect on pension benefits to be paid. Early years 
of service count for more as the rate of pay increases (Wallace 2002). Present 
day employees are unlikely to see DB schemes as an attractive option. Present 
day employees are more likely to change employers during their working lives 
than was the case when DB schemes were designed. Blake (2000) reports that 
in the UK only about five percent of present day employees would spend all their 
working lives with a single employer while on average a worker has been found 
to change jobs up to six times. Given that early leavers lose out on accumulated 
pension benefits and that the average worker frequently changes jobs, it is not 
difficult to see why there is a strong movement away from the DB pension 
schemes. 
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President of the Japan Centre for Economic Research, Yashiro (Wallace 2002, p. 
7) reports that in Japan "Companies are over-manned with middle - aged 
workers who lack motivation and skills". Employees in that position will most 
likely stay put because they stand to lose much while on the other hand legal 
restrictions may make them extremely difficult to get rid of. For this reason some 
companies may find DB schemes unattractive; such companies are more likely to 
set up DC schemes than they would set up DB schemes. 
Another reason responsible for the trend towards Defined Contribution pension 
scheme is the increase in life expectancy. Ross and Wills (2002) report that the 
life expectancy of a sixty year old has been increasing by about two years per 
decade and that the trend will continue for the foreseeable future. For pension 
funds, however, this is a worrisome development because it means there has 
been a significant increase in the cost of providing DB pension benefits. 
According to Everness, (Ross and Wills 2002) serious doubts have been raised 
on the capability of employers who have offered their employees DB pension 
schemes in the past being able to provide a comparable level of benefits in the 
future. 
Japan is one of the countries that have been affected by the increase in life 
expectancy at older ages. Takayana (Wallace 2002, p. 6), an economist at 
Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, explains "In Japan today all the problems are 
coming from defined benefit pledges that cannot be met". With this unfolding 
crisis very few organisations can be persuaded to set up or even to continue with 
DB schemes for their employees. 
Another reason cited as responsible for the change to DC schemes is to do with 
Accounting Standards. The relatively new regulations on accounting for Pension 
Fund liabilities as enunciated by the Financial Reporting Standard No. 17 (FRS 
17) are cited as having a contributory effect on the shortfalls. FRS 17 requires 
that assets and liabilities of the pension fund should be valued at market value 
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and that any loss or gain should be immediately reported rather than being 
spread over a period. Watson & Wyatt as cited by Gosling (2004) attributed a 
combined pension deficit of sixty billion British pounds suffered by FTSE 100 
companies in 2002 in the UK to FRS 17. Due to the losses being reported in 
compliance with FRS 17 some companies have decided to switch from the DB to 
the less costly DC scheme. However, according to Payne as cited by Ross and 
Wills, (2002) FRS 17 is only being used as a scapegoat while the valid reason is 
the fact that employers are now realizing the exact cost of providing DB plans. 
Ostaszewski (Ross and Wills 2002) outlines the reasons for the shift from DB to 
DC schemes as: -
a) The Risk Averse Employer Theory 
Under this theory, Ross and Wills (2002) see the volatility of today's capital 
markets and the unpredictable nature of money markets, dissuading employers 
from setting up DB pension schemes. DB pension schemes would ordinarily 
invest on the stock market but since values of investments on the stock market 
fluctuate, employers would be reluctant to set up a pension fund whose assets 
fluctuate from time to time, as they would be called upon to make good what 
would have been lost on the stock market. Because of this investment risk 
employers have opted for pension schemes whose costs are more predictable. 
With increased risks of continually having to bail out pension schemes under the 
DB structure, employers have opted for a lesser costly pension scheme, the DC. 
b) Excessive Regulation Theory 
Ross and Wills (2002) see governments as having a hand in the trend from DB to 
DC schemes. They argue that governments throughout the world have passed 
laws in an attempt to preserve retirement contributions made to pension plans. 
23 
This has often involved the imposition of strict funding and solvency laws. This 
they argue has been the case particularly so for the DB schemes. 
In the US companies operating the DB schemes are required to pay periodic 
premiums to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, a government 
corporation, which would pay vested pension benefits to members if a DB 
scheme winds up without adequate funding to pay members (Iwry 2003). 
Parallels can also be drawn with Zimbabwe where the Pensions and Provident 
Act Section 17 (1) requires that an actuary should value DB Schemes at least 
once every three years. To escape from this legal requirement and the attendant 
additional cost, companies would rather set up pension schemes which are not 
as regulated as the DB schemes. It is ironic that the laws and regulations that 
were put in place to protect members' interests have dissuaded some employers 
from continuing to operate a DB scheme for their employees. 
c) The New Economy Theory 
Under this theory, Ross and Wills (2002) argue that unlike years gone by, today's 
employees are quite mobile and are not likely to spend their entire working lives 
with a single employer. Today's worker is therefore unlikely to be attracted to a 
pension fund which offers an incentive to employees who serve only one 
employer over their whole working lives. Modern day workers would prefer a 
pension scheme which would offer exactly the same kinds of benefit to a worker 
who frequently changes jobs as the one who would prefer to stay with a single 
employer. Watson Wyatt (2002) report that women entering the labour force have 
fuelled the demand for more portable forms of pension schemes, as they make 
employment choices that accommodate home demands. For their portability, DC 
pension schemes are finding favour with today's workforce. 
Some observers have cited the rising costs of regulatory compliance as a factor 
which played a key role in the shift. Quite a significant portion of the costs of 
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compliance are fixed and as such migration from DB to DC has been more 
pronounced among small to medium enterprises (Watson Wyatt 2002). Some of 
the reasons cited by the World Bank as responsible for the change are reduction 
in full time salaried jobs and an increase in part time work, self employment and 
temporary jobs, globalisation and its competitive pressures 
(http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org). 
2.7 Country Specific Trends 
2.7.1 The United States 
In the US, the traditional pension scheme was often the Defined Benefit Scheme. 
Altmann (2001) as cited by Ross and Wills, reports that the change from DC to 
DB has been significant over a couple of decades with about ninety-seven 
percent (97%) of companies in the United States having moved over to DC 
plans. 
The Employee Benefit Research Institute (cited in Ross and Wills 2002) 
estimated that the number of employees covered by DC plans in the US 
increased by about six hundred percent (600%) between 1987 and 2002 from 
seven million to forty-two million. In the US both the number of DB schemes and 
members participating in them have been declining but the decline has been 
faster on the number of schemes than on the number of members (Iwry 2003). 
What cannot be denied is the fact that for many years very few if any new DB 
schemes have been established. The reasons for the shift are many but the 
fundamental one is the cost to the employer, associated with sponsoring a DB 
scheme (Twinney 1995). 
In the US among the companies that have abandoned the DB pension scheme 
include IBM, Verizon, Sears, Hewlett-Packard, United Airline, US Airways and 
Motorola (http://knowledge.wharton). Mitchell (2000) sees the rush to freeze DB 
schemes as a continuation of a long-term trend particularly that even well 
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established companies, which seemed to be viable were also joining the 
bandwagon. 
The change in the mix of jobs in the US economy has had a bearing on the trend 
from a DB to a DC scheme. DB schemes were more popular in the public sector 
and in the manufacturing sector but because of the changes in culture, 
technology and education, workers have grown increasingly familiar and 
comfortable with the stock market and mutual funds (Iwry 2003). This has, 
therefore, seen a marked decrease in demand for DB schemes where all 
investment decisions rest with the employer. 
2.7.2 The United Kingdom 
The private pension schemes in the UK like in the US have largely been DB 
schemes. As is the case with other Western countries, life expectancy in Britain 
has risen and has continued to rise in recent years. According to Randall (2004), 
some forecasts indicate that by the year 2040 more than twenty-five percent of 
the population in the UK will be over pensionable age. He further says if that 
happens, there will be too many people drawing out money and not enough 
paying money in. This would be an unhealthy situation as corporate funds coffers 
could be dried up paying out pension benefits. 
The rise in life expectancy in the UK, as in other countries has seen pension 
shortfalls being reported for DB pension schemes. Britain's biggest companies 
are grappling with a fifty to hundred billion British pound shortfall in corporate 
pensions (Randall 2004). The BBC (2004) quoted Famish, head of the National 
Association of Pension Funds in Britain, as having said that three quarters of final 
salary pension schemes (DB schemes) in the private sector are closed to new 
members and in some cases to existing members as well and that DB schemes 
could close within five years. Famish is further quoted as having said that in 
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future firms would be able to switch from final salary to money purchase 
schemes without members' consent. 
A number of factors have been cited as responsible for the emergence of 
shortfalls in DB schemes in the UK. Wallace (2002) reports that one of the major 
reasons is the abolishment in 1997 of the rule that allowed pension funds to 
receive dividends gross of tax. The change meant that the cost of funding 
pension funds was going to substantially increase given that British private 
pension funds were heavily invested in the stock market. According to Randall 
(2004), this change is costing pension funds about five billion British pounds per 
annum. 
2.7.3 Other Countries 
Like in the US and UK, the pensions' environment has not remained static in 
other countries. Watson and Wyatt (2002) reports that both Germany and Japan, 
with their rapidly aging populations, have adopted reforms that are meant to keep 
their pension systems in check by linking pension benefits to demographics like 
workforce and life expectancy. Wallace (2002) also reports that things are 
changing in German where company pension schemes, which provide about five 
percent of retirement income, have predominantly been DB schemes. The 
following is the position on selected countries as reported by Wallace 
(2002, pp. 4-8); 
• In Japan for the first time companies are now able to offer DC pension 
schemes. 
• In Sweden private pension plans are being switched from DB to DC 
schemes. Variants of the Swedish model have been implemented in 
Poland and Latvia; the effect however is the same, shifting from the DB to 
the DC scheme. 
• Chile moved from the DB to the compulsory DC private scheme. 
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• Canada is one country yet to undergo any major shift away from DB plans, 
seen in other countries. DC schemes in Canada are marginally more 
than DB schemes but DC membership is far less than DB membership. 
The World Bank (http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org) reports that there is a 
misplaced belief that because demographics are favourable in the Middle East 
and Africa, financial problems in the pension industry are far off in the future. To 
the contrary the World Bank says in almost all countries in the Middle East and 
Africa the aging of populations is occurring at a faster pace than in developed 
countries. 
From the foregoing, it would seem the challenges facing pension funds even in 
the developed world are so serious that reform is inevitable. The problems are 
such that something has to be done. Either benefits have to be cut or contribution 
rates have to be substantially increased. If not introduced now it could be too late 
in the future since it may take time for the effects of reform to make an impact. 
The good news is that pension schemes are being reformed in most of these 
countries (Wallace 2002). 
In Zimbabwe the Zimbabwe Association of Pension Funds (2005) reported that 
over the last two years as much as ninety-four employers changed their schemes 
form DB to DC schemes due to the high cost of providing DB schemes to 
members. One of the biggest DB schemes in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority Staff Pension Fund reported in its 2004 Financial 
Statements (p 3) that an actuarial valuation carried out on its DB pension scheme 
revealed a shortfall of nineteen billion Zimbabwe dollars (US$ 3 707 920 using 
the then ruling exchange rate). The extent of the shortfalls forced it to change 
from a DB to a DC pension scheme. 
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2.7.4 Analysis of the Trend 
With rising pension shortfalls on DB schemes, companies have been caught up 
in an intricate web. On one hand companies want to provide for their employees' 
retirement needs by setting up pension funds while on the other hand the 
pension funds they have set may have become too huge. Caught in that situation 
even the well-meaning companies may no longer completely shield their 
employees from the impact of the harsh reality that DB pension schemes could 
be very costly to sponsor. Realising the cost implications of sponsoring DB 
pension schemes, it has come as no surprise that some companies are now 
switching from DB to DC schemes where shortfalls that may arise are the 
responsibility of the individuals not their employer (Wallace 2002). 
The pension reforms sweeping across most countries in the developed world are 
transforming both state and company pensions into funds that allow individual 
employees to take active steps in the management of their pension investments. 
On the other hand, it also means many members of pension funds will face new 
forms of risk particularly investment risk for which members may not have been 
adequately prepared. Ross and Wills (2002) state that placing investment risk on 
members of pension funds can be beneficial if the members concerned know 
their responsibilities or where a close connection between the members and their 
retirement savings plan, exists. That may, however, not be the case for most 
members and, when this happens; Ross and Wills (2002) conclude that 
individuals concerned could have a rude awakening at retirement, as the amount 
they would have accumulated would be nowhere near the amount they hoped 
for. 
From the above literature review, there is overwhelming evidence showing a 
clear shift from DB to DC schemes. The question that needs to be addressed is 
whether members would be worse off under a DC scheme than they would have 
been under the DB scheme. Bezooyen (1997) argues that whereas in theory it 
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may seem as if employees are better off under a DB scheme than they would be 
under a DC one and employers are better off because of the difference in who 
bears the investment risk, in practice this may not be so. Studies carried out by 
Samwich and Skinner as cited by Li (2003) showed that DC plans could have 
comparable returns with DB plans. They indicated that the reason why DC plans 
can fail to provide comparable benefits to members is inadequate contribution 
rates. Ross and Wills (2002) argue that both DB and DC participants have 
concerns. DC participants are worried about the amount they have to invest, 
whereas DB participants worry about whether the employer will be able to fully 
fund their pension scheme. 
While there has been a perception that DB schemes are safe and guaranteed, 
the developments in the last decade should have proved that DB schemes are 
risky too (Mitchell 2000). Researches carried out in both the US and the UK, 
showed that most DB schemes are under-funded. Watson and Wyatt report that 
the percentage of employers with fully funded pension schemes in the US 
declined from eighty-four percent in 1998 to thirty-seven percent in 2002 
(http://www.watsonwyatt.com). At the end of 2002 General Motors reported that 
its pension scheme obligations were under-funded to the tune of nineteen billion 
US dollars (http://www.knowledqe.wharton.upenn.edu). All this shows that the 
DB scheme has potential to provide a stable income to members when they 
reach retirement age. However, in reality this may remain an unfulfilled potential 
(Mitcell 2000). Under a DB scheme, it is the employer who benefits through lower 
contributions rates when investment returns exceed expectations but under a DC 
scheme, participants get the full benefits. On the other hand, the employer bears 
the brunt of lower-than-expected returns. This does not make DB schemes safe, 
as events have shown. Both types of schemes have their merits and demerits; it 
could be individual circumstances, which determine which scheme an individual 
would be more comfortable with. 
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In developed countries cited above, the trend has shown that the present 
pension structures may no longer be relevant to today's circumstances. The DB 
type pension funds were set up when the population was still young and the life 
expectancy after retirement so short. Demographic changes that have taken 
place, the crush of the stock markets, the emergence of a young educated 
workforce, the entrance by women on the employment scene and the new 
accounting requirements have all connived to influence drastic changes in how 
the pensions in the developed world are structured. 
2.8 Conclusion 
From what has happened to other DB pension schemes, it seems there are 
lessons to be learnt by the ZRA Pension Fund. The ZRA Pension Fund has been 
recording pension shortfalls to the same, if not to a worse, extent than what has 
happened in other organizations which reformed their pension schemes. The 
only difference could be in the underlying reasons causing the shortfalls. 
Going by the trends in the developed countries, reform of the pension fund 
structures is inevitable. It would be worse for the developing world with their little 
resources than it has been for the developed world. The sooner the reforms are 
carried out, the better. The greater the delay, the more time and money are 
wasted. Every year that passes by without any reform adds more to the liabilities 
of pension funds. Reform could be a bitter pill to swallow for members of the ZRA 
Pension Fund but it would seem it is inevitable. 
31 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods that were employed to collect and analyse 
the data. The chapter also details which sources the data was collected from. 
This research is a case study on the Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund. The 
research questions have been identified in the first chapter. This has been 
followed by the review of literature on pension funds. A comparison of the 
different types of pension schemes was done in the second chapter. The second 
chapter also detailed the problems being faced in operating pension schemes 
and solutions being proffered to keep the schemes afloat. Chapter Four dwells 
on the goings on in the ZRA Pension Fund, the benefit structure and the 
performance of the fund. This will be followed by the discussions of results in 
Chapter Five and recommendations on the best way forward in Chapter Six. 
3.2 The Research Design and Methodology 
3.2.1 Sampling Design and Sampling Technique 
The sampling frame is the number of pension schemes in Zimbabwe. The 
Registrar of Pension Funds in Zimbabwe has put the number of pension funds at 
two thousand seven hundred as at December 2004, (Zimbabwe Association of 
Pension Funds 2005). The sample size is however limited to the Zambezi River 
Authority Pension Scheme. The ZRA Pension Scheme was compared with other 
Pension Funds in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world. 
3.2.2 Design and Analytic Techniques 
An expost facto design was used in this study as a report can only be made on 
what is and what has happened to the Zambezi River Authority Pension Scheme. 
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The study critically looks at the benefit structure of the ZRA pension fund and its 
suitability to today's circumstances. The financial performance of the fund, 
including the choice of investment portfolios, was scrutinized, and so were the 
levels and appropriateness of pension contributions by the members and the 
employer. The general management of the ZRA Pension Fund was reviewed. A 
comparison with other comparable funds was made as well as a comparison with 
the trends elsewhere in the world. The study looked at the financial performance 
of the ZRA pension fund from 1996 to 2004. 
The design is a longitudinal case study design. The variables, which are, the 
benefit structure, the average rate of return, foreign exchange rates, the inflation 
rates and the level of contributions, were measured over time. The impact of 
these variables was analysed. The objective was to get insights into the causes 
of the pension shortfalls being recorded and to come up with possible solutions. 
The research is mainly quantitative as it involves collection of data from the 
Pension Fund, the Central Statistics Office and analysis of investments 
performance by Fund Managers. Data was also extracted from literary 
publications on Pension Funds. 
3.2.3 Data Collection Methods 
The records of the Pension Fund were the main source of the data used. In 
particular, extensive use was made of the ZRA Pension Fund Rules, the Annual 
Accounts and the Actuarial Reports produced during the period under review. 
Records of the ZRA Pension Fund were, however, supplemented by interviews 
held with the Trustees of the Pension Fund, reading through analysis of Fund 
Managers and other publications on pension funds. Board and Management 
minutes were also used as sources of information. In order to make a proper 
comparison of the fund's financial performance, the performance of alternative 
investment options was considered. Publications on the property, stock and 
money markets in Zimbabwe, were analysed. 
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The historical exchange rates used by ZRA were obtained from ZRA records. 
This is particularly relevant as salaries of ZRA employees are quoted in US dollar 
terms though paid in the local currency. In order to get a better understanding of 
the funding of pension funds, unstructured interviews were conducted with a 
number of pension fund managers. Rates of inflation in Zimbabwe were 
obtained from the Central Statistics Office of Zimbabwe in order to measure the 
returns of the Pension Fund against annual inflation rates. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
In order to identify the causes of the pension shortfalls, the first thing was to 
critically look at the structure of the pension benefits payable to members upon 
retirement. Examples were used to illustrate the growth in pension benefits for 
members. 
The study also critically examined the financial performance of the ZRA Pension 
Fund from the period 1996 to 2004. The returns realized from the investment 
choices made by the trustees were critically analysed with questions being asked 
on whether higher yielding investments could not be found. Line graphs and 
tables were used to illustrate the relationships between investment returns and 
the increase in pension benefits over time. 
The limitations imposed by the law on investment choices were also reviewed. 
The level of pension contributions by members was scrutinized comparing the 
levels to other pension funds in Zimbabwe. Tables and histograms were used to 
visualise the levels of pension contributions. The role of trustees and indeed 
members were reviewed with the aim of finding a solution to the problems being 
faced by the ZRA Pension Fund. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
This study is a case study, centering on collection of historical data about the 
ZRA Pension Fund. Having outlined the methodology used in the gathering of the 
data, in this chapter, the next chapter presents the results of the research. 
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Chapter 4 Research Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Like every responsible employer, the predecessor to the Zambezi River 
Authority, the Central African Power Corporation, set up a pension scheme for its 
employees. According to the rules of the ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund 
Section 4 (1), the scheme was to be a self-administered fund. The fund was to 
maintain its own accounts, separate from those of its main sponsor (Section 4 (8) 
of the Rules) and was to be separately audited (Section 4 (10) of the Rules). 
Membership to the scheme was initially restricted to a certain category of staff 
but this changed over the years (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules 
Section 8). This chapter gives a brief background of the sponsor of the fund, 
details about the fund, membership, administration and the financial performance 
of the fund over the period under review. 
4. 2 Background of the Sponsor 
Zambezi River Authority is a successor organization to the Central African Power 
Corporation (CAPCO). CAPCO was set up as a government entity in 1956 by the 
then Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (The Central African 
Power Act Section 3 of the laws of the then Federal Government of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland). It had the mandate to "construct, establish, acquire, maintain 
and operate undertakings including main transmission lines" (The CAPCO Act 
Section 3 (a)). This meant that ultimately CAPCO was to operate the Kariba Dam 
and the two hydro- power stations on the banks of the Zambezi River, one on the 
Northern Rhodesian (now Zambian) side and the other on the Southern 
Rhodesian (now Zimbabwean) side. CAPCO had also the mandate to transmit 
the power generated from the two power stations to the mines and industries 
within the federation. 
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Due to the developments in the political and power sectors in the two countries, 
CAPCO was dissolved in 1987 (Minutes of the Higher Authority on the 
Reconstruction of CAPCO, 1987). From the ashes of CAPCO, Zambezi River 
Authority was born, through the passing of parallel legislation in both Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. However the functions of power generation and transmission were 
transferred to the power utility of the country in which the power stations and 
transmission lines were domiciled. According to the Zambezi River Authority Act 
of the laws of Zambia and Zimbabwe, Article 9, ZRA was mandated with the 
main function of operating, monitoring and maintaining the Kariba Dam wall and 
its reservoir whose waters feed the two power stations. 
The other functions of ZRA as set out in the schedule to the Zambezi River 
Authority Act of Zambia and Zimbabwe Article 9 include: 
• Construction, operation, monitoring and maintenance of any other dam 
on the Zambezi River common to the two states. 
• Collection, accumulation and processing of hydrological and 
environmental data on the Zambezi River. 
• Regulating the water levels in the Kariba reservoir and in any other 
reservoir owned by the Authority. 
Currently ZRA gets its revenue from billing the two power utilities, ZESCO limited 
in Zambia and the Zimbabwe Power Company in Zimbabwe, who draw water 
from the Kariba Dam for power generation. The water bills are denominated in 
the United States dollars but payments are made in the currency of the country in 
which the power station is situated (Water Purchase Agreement ZRA/KNBC/ZPC 
Article v of 2000). The exchange rate used is the rate of exchange of ZRA's 
bankers, and is adjusted every quarter (Water Purchase Agreement 
ZRA/KNBC/ZPC Article vii). 
ZRA has its Head Office in Lusaka, Zambia, a liaison office in Harare, Zimbabwe 
and an operational office in Kariba, at the dam site. 
37 
4.3 The Pension Fund 
Like its sponsor, The Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund is a successor fund 
to the Central African Power Corporation Pension Fund, which was set up in 
1978. ZRA took over the sponsorship of the ZRA pension scheme from October 
1987, following its enactment. ZRA sponsors two separate pension funds, one 
for Zambian nationals and the other for Zimbabwean ones. 
This presentation will focus on the Zimbabwean pension scheme. Some 
comparisons will, however, be made between the two funds. Both schemes were 
set up as a self-administered defined benefit schemes and to a large extent are 
similar. 
4.3.1 The Objective of the Fund 
The objective of the pension fund is to provide pension benefits to members on 
their retirement through old age or ill health and for their dependents when they 
(members) die (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 2). 
4.3.2 Administration of the Fund 
The pension fund is vested in and administered by five trustees of whom the 
employer appoints two, while the rest are elected by members every three years 
(ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 4 (1)). Of the trustees 
appointed by the employer, one who is the chairman of the trustees is the 
Finance Director of ZRA and the other is the principal officer of the fund. The 
principal officer, who is also an employee of ZRA, does the day-to-day running of 
the pension fund (The ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 4 
(2a)). 
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The ZRA Pension Fund trustees are empowered to make any arrangements and 
regulations for the administration and control of the fund without doing anything 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the rules (The ZRA Pension and Life 
Assurance Fund Rules Section 5). The trustees are also empowered to make 
investment decisions in accordance with the provisions of the Pensions and 
Provident Funds Act of Zimbabwe (The ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund 
Rules Section 5). The business of the trustees is conducted at meetings at which 
a quorum of not less than four trustees is to be present (ZRA Pension and Life 
Assurance Fund Rules Section 4 (3)). 
The Pensions and Provident Fund Act Section 18 (1), of the laws of Zimbabwe, 
preclude the trustees from investing outside Zimbabwe any amount of a pension 
fund registered in Zimbabwe. The ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules 
Section 4 (8b) prohibit trustees from investing more than twenty-five per centum 
of the aggregate value of all the assets of the fund in immovable property. 
The trustees are to ensure that full and true accounts of the fund are kept and 
annually audited by a registered auditor, appointed by them (ZRA Pension and 
Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 4 (10)). The trustees are also required by the 
provisions of the Pension and Provident Fund Act Section 17 (1) of the laws of 
Zimbabwe, to cause the fund to be evaluated every three years by a registered 
actuary. 
4.3.3 Nature of the Fund's Benefit Structure 
The ZRA pension scheme promises to pay to members a defined pension benefit 
which is linked to period of service and final salary (ZRA Pension and Life 
Assurance Fund Rules Section 9 (5)). The pension benefit is paid upon 
retirement. The normal retirement age of the ZRA Pension Fund is sixty years, 
members may however, retire from the service of ZRA upon reaching their fifty-
fifth birthday (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 9 (1&2)). 
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Membership of the pension fund also ceases when members leave their 
employment with ZRA through death, dismissal or resignation (ZRA Pension and 
Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 8(2)). 
According to the ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 9 (4 -11), 
the pension benefits payable to members when they leave the employment 
services of ZRA can be summarized as follows: 
(i) An item called the Aggregate Basic Salary is calculated by multiplying 
the member's highest annual basic salary by the member's period of 
continuous service. 
(ii) A lump sum benefit is then calculated by multiplying the Aggregate 
Basic Salary by a percentage which varies in accordance with the 
member's completed period of continuous service as shown in table 
4.1 below. 
(iii) Where a member retires or dies in service, he or his beneficiaries can 
opt to be paid a lump sum commutation of one third of the total amount 
payable as a pension benefit. Where a member ceases to be a 
member by any other reason other than death or retirement, the lump 
sum benefit is paid in full, less statutory deductions. 
(iv) Where a member retires his pension benefit is increased by a "pension 
escalation factor". The "pension escalation factor" is based on a 
sliding scale starting at zero at the age of fifty-five rising to a maximum 
of fifty-four percent (of the amount calculated in (ii) above) at the age of 
sixty years. 
(v) The resultant amount (less the one third lump sum commutation, 
where a member so opts) is used to procure from an insurer to be 
nominated by the member, an annuity from which the member would 
draw monthly pension payments. 
(vi) A member who dies, resigns or is otherwise fired before reaching 
retirement age, is treated the same way as the one who retires. The 
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only difference is that there is no escalation factor added to his pension 
benefit, 
(vii) Where a member is discharged from ZRA on the grounds of 
redundancy, or on grounds of ill health the pension benefit payable is 
increased by an additional benefit. 
An unusual feature of the pension fund's benefit structure is that more or less the 
same benefit is payable in the event of death, retirement, and withdrawal. The 
only difference is the pension escalation factor, which is paid to retirees on a 
sliding scale as explained above. Table 4.1 below gives percentages that are 
applied to the aggregate basic salaries of members to arrive at the pension 
benefits payable to members, depending on their period of continuous service. 
Table 4.1 Member's Benefit on Leaving ZRA 
CONTINUOUS SERVICE 
Less than 3 years 
3 or more but less than 5 years 
5 or more but less than 7 years 
7 or more but less than 9 years 
9 or more but less thanl 1 years 
11 or more but less than 13 years 
13 or more years 









Pension Scheme Rules 
4.3.4 Membership of the Fund 
The ZRA Pension Fund was set up in 1978 and membership was restricted to 
members of staff occupying senior positions in the organization. It was not until 
July 1993 when it became a condition of employment that all employees of the 
Zambezi River Authority were to be members of the pension fund (ZRA Pension 
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and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 8 (1)). This meant that all persons who 
became employees on or after 1 July 1993 were to be members of the scheme 
from the date of their becoming eligible employees. When the Fund was set up in 
1978 it had a total of fifteen members (CAPCO Pension and Life Assurance Fund 
Reports). Over the years membership of the ZRA Pension Fund grew as 
depicted in the table 4.2 below. 
As can be seen from the history of membership of the Pension Fund, 
membership more than doubled during the 1993/1994 financial year. This was 
due to the change in the conditions of employment alluded to above. The 
increased membership was to have a bearing on the financial position of the 
pension fund more so because the new members had their membership to the 
pension fund backdated to the time they joined the organization. This meant that 
even though the new members were not members at the time they joined the 
organization, they were going to benefit as if they had been admitted into 
membership at the date of joining CAPCO or ZRA. 
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Table 4.2 Annual Membership of the Zambezi River Authority Pension 
Fund 
Source: ZRA Pension Fund Annual Statements 1996 to 2004 
4.3.5 Contributions 
The current rules provide that members should make monthly contributions to the 
fund from the date of commencement of their participation (ZRA Pension and Life 
Assurance Fund Rules Section 17(1)). However, when the Pension Fund was set 
up in 1978, only the employer was required to make contributions to the fund. 
The rules were amended in 1982 and since then each member has been making 
a monthly contribution of two and half percent of his pensionable emoluments 
while the employer contributes eight and half percent of the pensionable 
emoluments of each member. However, since the fund is a Defined Benefit 
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scheme, ZRA as the main sponsor still remains responsible for any shortfalls that 
may arise on the fund. 
The ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 17(3)) stipulate that if 
on any valuation of the fund, the assets of the Fund exceed the Fund's liabilities 
to its members such excess will be retained in the Fund for the purpose of 
offsetting future contributions. However, where there is a shortfall, the employer 
is to make good such a shortfall (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules 
Section 17 (3). Apart from meeting pension shortfalls that may arise, the 
employer is also responsible for making special contributions for members who 
will be entitled to a pension escalation upon their retirement (ZRA Pension and 
Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 15A). No contribution is required from 
qualifying members. The employer is also responsible for meeting all the 
administration costs like the actuarial valuation, the annual audit etc (ZRA 
Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 4(9)). 
The employer deducts members' pension contributions from their monthly 
salaries. The deductions together with contributions by the employer have to be 
paid to the pension fund by the 21st of the month following the one in which 
deductions are made (ZRA Pension and Life Assurance Fund Rules Section 
17(5)). When payment is received by the fund it is deposited into the fund's 
account, after which a decision is made on how to invest the money. 
4.3.6 Exchange Rates Used By ZRA 
It is important at this stage to mention that a decision was made by the Board of 
Directors of ZRA to quote salaries and allowances of ZRA employees in a 
common currency, the United States dollar (ZRA Administration Manual Section 
2.3.1). However, payment is made in the local currency of the country in which 
the employee resides. The rate of exchange to be used is a commercial bank's 
selling rate. The exchange rate is adjusted once every quarter (ZRA 
Administration Manual Section 2.3.1). 
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From January 2000 to December 2003 the government of Zimbabwe was 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate of the local currency to that of other 
currencies. During that period the exchange rate used by ZRA to convert the US 
dollar to the local currency was as determined by the Board of Directors from 
time to time (Minutes of the 63rd ZRA Board Meeting 2000). No strict formula 
was being applied in coming up with the exchange rate for this period. 
In December 2003 a decision was then made to use the Zimbabwe Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) differential to adjust the exchange rate every quarter (Minutes 
of the 70th ZRA Board Meeting, 2003). From January 2004 to July 2005 the CPI 
differential was being applied to the previous quarter's exchange rate to arrive at 
the present quarter's exchange rate. For the ZRA pension scheme this means 
that the final salary, on which the pension benefit is based, is quoted in the US 
dollar. It is therefore important that returns on investments of pension funds 
should at least match the exchange rate fluctuations if the employer is to avoid 
having to bail out the pension fund. Whether or not this has been the case, the 
next chapter shows. Table 4.3 below shows the exchange rates used by ZRA 
over the period. 
It is also pertinent to mention that with effect from October 1994 each employer 
and employee were required by a new law, to contribute three percent of the 
employee's annual basic salary of the first Z$48 000 (then about US$6 000) to 
the National Social Security Scheme (The National Social Security Act Section 3 
(2) of the laws of Zimbabwe) which was introduced by the government. The 
contribution to National Social Security Scheme (NSSA) then was equivalent to 
US$ 180 per annum each from the employer and the employee. The 
contributions were over and above contributions to the pension fund. This meant 
that the employer was now paying more towards pension related expenses as 
there were no changes made either to the contributions payable or to the benefits 
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4.3.7 Salary Increases for ZRA Pension Fund Members 
Salary increases awarded to employees of ZRA were going to make an impact 
on pension benefits payable to members. Table 4.4 below gives the increments 
awarded to ZRA employees from 1996 to 2005. 
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Table 4.4 Salary Increases Awarded to ZRA Pension Fund Members 
Source Compiled from Various ZRA Records 
4.3.8 Legal Requirements 
The Pensions and Provident Fund Act of 1976 govern all Pension Funds in 
Zimbabwe. Notable among the provisions of the said act are the following, that, 
• Defined Benefit Pension Schemes are to be valued by an actuarial expert 
at least once every three years (Pensions and Provident Funds Act 
Section 17 of the laws of Zimbabwe). 
• A registered fund should at all times hold no less than forty five percent of 
the aggregate cost value of all its assets in Zimbabwe in the form of 
prescribed assets (Pensions and Provident Funds Act Section 18(2a) of 
the laws of Zimbabwe). Such prescribed assets include Treasury Bills, 
Government Bonds or Bills and Stocks issued by local Authorities or 
Parastatal companies. 
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• All investments of Pension Funds are to be held in Zimbabwe and be 
denoted in the Zimbabwean currency (Pensions and Provident Funds Act 
Section 18(1) of the laws of Zimbabwe). 
From the above provisions it is clear that the ZRA pension scheme could not 
legally hedge itself against the fluctuations of the home currency to that of the 
US$, in which pension benefits are effectively denominated. What the pension 
fund can do is to find within Zimbabwe, investments whose returns match any 
such exchange rate fluctuations. Whether this is possible, is debatable and is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3.9 Financial Performance of the Fund over the Years 
The Annual Financial Statements of the pension fund in tables 4.5 and 4.6 below 
show the financial performance of the fund over the years. 
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Table 4.5 
ZAMBEZI RIVER AUTHORITY PENSION FUND 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FROM 1996 TO 2004 
INCOME STATEMENT 
INCOME 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Z$000's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's 
Balance of Fund at beginning of Year 16644 24815 30382 86746 116555 228009 326643 697107 3848408 
Contributions By Members-Compulsory 
Contributions By Members-Voluntary 
Contributions By Employer-Normal 
Contributions By Employer-Special 





















2660 5716 19504 36032 
259 637 1064 2158 
49118 304336 3089048 7029682 
1257 3032 30720 0 
Income from Investments 
Transfer from Reserve 


























25852 41516 100637 125680 240705 341177 747270 4126238 13635855 
Increase in Contributions 
Return on Investment (Average) 0.19135 
0.39776 9.60056 -0.7 2.76307 -0.1298 4.97054 9.00877 1.2729083 
0.1854 0.24089 0.20041 0.34178 0.1623 0.19877 0.12579 0.0834124 
EXPENDITURE 
Pension Award on Retirement 
Pension Award on Death 
Pension Award on Resignation/dismissi 
Property Maintenance 
Investments writedown 
Transfer to Reserve for future liability 































































Source Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund Financial Statements 1996 to 2004 
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Table 4.6 ZRA Pension Fund Balance Sheets From 1996 to 2004 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FROM 1996 TO 2004 
BALANCE SHEET 
LIABILITIES 
Amount of Fund 






INCREASE IN LIABILITIES 
ASSETS 
Buildings 
Shares in Companies 
Govt/Local Authority Stocks 
Money Market Investments 
Contributions Receivable 
Interest Accrued 
Cash at Bank- Current A/c 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Z$000's ZSOOO's Z$000's Z$000's Z$000's Z$000's Z$000's ZSOOO's ZSOOO's 
30382 86746 116555 228009 326643 697107 3848408 12228188 
1146 2577 3182 4132 4373 4058 34777 34778 
363 0 5430 
345 842 3712 3350 6446 1040 98362 
26621 "31891 89668 120579 235853 334366 707611 3884225 12366758 




































20000 124289 124288 
233 1539 13438 
54374 53424 41217 
192814 232073 524277 
62393 264425 2994819 
2752 23875 68579 








INCREASE IN ASSETS 
Percentage of Cont. Receivable 
NOTES 
26621 31891 89668 120579 235853 334366 707611 3884225 12366758 
0.197964 1.8117 0.34473 0.956 0.41769 1.11628 4.48921 2.183842 
0.03 0.00 0.49 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.37 0.77 0.70 
1. Assets in the accounts are stated at market value 
Source Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund Financial Statements 1996 to 2004 
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Notes to the Accounts 
1. Transfer to Reserve 
The transfer to reserves represents the fund's added liability to members who would 
be entitled to the pension escalation benefit on retirement only. 
2. Transfer from Reserve 
The transfers from the reserve account represent payments made/due to members 
entitled to the additional pension escalation benefit 
3. Decrease/Increase In Value of Investments 
The amounts represent the decrease or increase in the estimated current value of 
investments held, were they to be terminated at the balance sheet date. The 
estimated current value is based on a valuation list issued by the main dealers in the 
stock. 
4. Reserve for Future Liability 
The amounts represent the estimated future liability in respect of members aged 55 
or above for escalation of Pension Benefits on retirement only. 
5. Amount of or Balance of Fund 
The amount is equal to the liability for members' benefits accrued at the balance 
sheet date. 
6. Contributions By Employer-Special 
The special contributions by employer represent amounts that are contributed by 
employer specifically to meet the added liability to members who will be entitled to 
pension escalation at the time of retirement. 
7. Contributions Receivable 
The rules of the fund provide for the calculations of contributions quarterly. The 
Contributions Receivable represents the amount owed by the employer at the 
balance sheet date, after the quarterly calculations. 
4.4 The Macroeconomic Environment 
In recent years the macroeconomic environment of Zimbabwe has presented 
unprecedented economic challenges to the business community in general and 
to companies which sponsor a DB schemes in particular. Pension Funds have 
witnessed a serious erosion of the value of the local currency by hyperinflation. 
Table 4.7 below gives inflation rates obtaining in Zimbabwe since 1996 as well as 
51 
percentage increases in the exchange rates (ZW$ to US$) used by ZRA over the 
same period. 
Table 4.7 Inflation Figures for Zimbabwe and Increases in ZRA Exchange 
Rates ZW$ to US$ 
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* Data shown up October 2005 
Source Compiled from data obtained from The Zimbabwe Central 
Statistics Office and ZRA records 
4.5 Conclusion 
At the time the Zambezi River Authority pension fund was established in 1978, 
members were not required to make contributions to the fund. Contributions from 
members were only required from 1982. From July 1993, every employee was to 
become a member of the pension scheme, for those who were already in the 
service of ZRA, their membership was backdated to the time they joined ZRA, 
with obvious financial implications. 
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From the financial statements it is clear that most of the investments of the 
pension scheme were short-term, in the money market. However, pension fund 
obligations are long term in nature. The mismatch between the two would 
obviously create problems for the fund. 
The salaries of ZRA employees were denominated in US dollars and paid in the 
local currency. By extension it also meant that pension benefits were 
denominated in the US dollar though payable in the local currency. The stability 
of the local currency was therefore going to play a part in the sustainability of the 
fund. The fact that pension benefits were denominated in the in the US dollar but 
in line with the laws of Zimbabwe, all investments were to be held in the local 
currency was also going to have an effect. 
The Zimbabwean law requires that a pension fund should invest a percentage of 
its assets in prescribed assets, but the question to ask is whether the interest 
rates offered under these prescribed assets were competitive. The Pensions and 
Provident Fund Act also provides that a DB pension scheme is to be valued 
every three years, after which the employer is to meet any shortfall arising. This 
also was to present challenges to the ZRA Pension Fund. The macro-economic 
environment was also going to present challenges to both the pension scheme 
and ZRA. These issues and more are examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Results Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The setting up of a pension scheme for employees of CAPCO (now ZRA) 
showed noble ideas on the part of the employer to take care of the financial 
needs of the employees and/or their beneficiaries, when they retire or die. 
However, this on its own was not going to ensure that the financial security of 
employees was guaranteed. The first requirement for survival of the pension 
scheme is that the main stakeholders, the employer and the employee, must be 
willing and able to continually finance the fund. This can only be possible if the 
benefit structure of the fund does not place unrealistic funding demands on the 
employer and the members and the operating environment is enabling. In other 
words the benefits have to be realistic, while the social, economic and regulatory 
environment must be supportive, or at the very least, non-inhibiting. Yet in the 
past five years it is generally agreed that the economic, demographic and 
political conditions in Zimbabwe have been less than ideal for the survival of 
pension funds in general and defined pension funds in particular. 
The Chapter on literature review revealed that organizations in the Western world 
were struggling with DB pension shortfalls which have been occasioned by rising 
life expectancy, the benefit structure of the DB schemes and the volatility of the 
stock market amongst other reasons. This chapter shows that the benefit 
structure of the ZRA pension fund may have been sustainable when the fund 
was set up but conditions have gradually deteriorated. As such the benefit 
structure is no longer sustainable. Apart from the benefit structure and the 
macro-economic environment being less than ideal, the chapter also highlights 
the importance of the employer having to play its part. The contributions from 
both the members and the employer have to be adequate. 
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5.2 Membership of the ZRA Pension Fund 
Though the period prior to 1996 is outside the purview of this study, a brief 
review of the background will put issues into context. Membership of the ZRA 
Pension Fund shown in table 4.2 shows that when the fund was set up in 1978 it 
only had fifteen members. Membership then grew to seventy-nine by June 1993. 
Due to the change in the pension rules on qualification of members referred to 
earlier, membership doubled during the financial year 1994 to reach one hundred 
and ninety four. Since then membership has been on the decline as a result of 
the employer's deliberate policy to reduce its staff establishment. 
The change in membership rules of the ZRA Pension Fund meant that more 
employees were now entitled to pension benefits than had been the case 
previously. Since the benefit structure of the pension fund was not changed, this 
also meant that the employer had to put in more money in the fund to cater for 
the increased obligations of the fund. It must also be noted that the new 
members were to be entitled to pension benefits as if they had been members of 
the pension fund from the date of their joining the ZRA. 
What started as a small fund for a few employees had now grown by more than 
ten times by 1994 and yet no change had been made to the benefit structure nor 
to member contributions to take account of the additional burden. At the time a 
decision to allow new members was made, no analysis was made to determine 
whether the employer was going to comfortably carry the added responsibility. 
It was a noble idea to have admitted the new members who were the lowly paid 
junior employees who probably needed to be covered by the pension fund much 
more than senior employees did. However, it was also important to have 
considered the impact it was going to have on the finances of the employer. If 
that had been done the effects could have been minimized by, for instance, 
reducing on the pension benefits payable to members or by increasing 
membership contributions. 
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The membership history of the fund (table 4.2) shows that the decrease in 
membership from one hundred and eighty-six members in 1996 to one hundred 
and forty members at the end of 2004 was mostly a result of members retiring. 
As members were retiring they were being paid their accrued benefits. From 
1996 to 2004 a total of eighty-two members withdrew from the ZRA Pension 
Fund while a total of thirty-four new members joined the Fund during the same 
period. 
It is pertinent to mention that the most significant awards have been paid out on 
account of retirement as such death through HIV related illnesses has not had 
much of an adverse effect on pension payouts. 
5.3 The Implications of the ZRA Pension Fund Benefit Structure 
One of the criticisms of the DB pension scheme at least from the point of view of 
the employer, is that the costs of operating such a scheme are not predictable. It 
could be costly to the employer in cases where salaries and inflation exceed 
expectations. 
Holding inflation constant, the decrease in membership mentioned above would 
have seen a reduction in the accrued benefits of members. Indeed in US dollar 
terms, the accrued benefits of members reduced by fifteen percent from 
US$ 2 844 124 (ZW$26 621 000) in 1996 to US$ 2 406 452 
(ZW$ 12 366 758 000) at the end of 2004 as shown on table 4.6. The reason for 
the reduction in accrued benefits is three fold. The reduction in the membership 
of the Pension Fund of about twenty five percent from one hundred eighty-six in 
1996 to one hundred and forty in 2004 (refer to table 4.2). Secondly, new 
members who joined the pension fund were still to accumulate substantial 
pension benefits. Their length of service was still low compared to the members 
who they were replacing. Thirdly, members who were retiring had accumulated 
the highest possible pension benefits and were being paid off as they retired. 
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However, even with the three favourable factors chipping in, there was still an 
increase in accumulated benefits of members in Zimbabwe dollar terms over the 
period 1996 to 2004. There was an accumulated pension benefits increase of 
46 355 percent from ZW$26 621 000 in 1996, to ZW$12 366 758 000 in 2004. 
The question that needs to be addressed is whether the magnitude of the 
increase in Zimbabwe dollar terms i.e. 46 355 percent could have been achieved 
through normal pension contributions and return on investments of the pension 
fund. Table 5.2 below may help to illustrate the point. 
The table below shows that the return on average assets that the pension fund 
has been realizing on its investments was fluctuating between eight percent and 
thirty-four percent. The table shows that in the later years (2001 to 2004) the 
ZRA Pension Fund was achieving lower returns on average assets than it was 
achieving in earlier years (1996 to 2000). This was despite the fact that between 
1996 and 2000 annual inflation rates were much lower than they were between 
2001 and 2004. One would have expected the return on average assets to 
substantially go up in proportion to inflation rates. This could be partly attributed 
to the fact that the employer was increasingly finding it difficult to meet his 
obligations as is explained under 5.5. Low returns on prescribed assets also 
contributed. 
57 
Table 5.2 Statistical Figures on Zimbabwe and the ZRA Pension Fund 1995 
TO 2005 
































































































* Data shown is up to October 2005 
Source Compiled from data gathered from The Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange, The Central Statistics Office and the Annual 
Accounts of the Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund. 
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Similarly when the Zimbabwean dollar was depreciating at an increased rate to 
the US dollar between 2001 and 2004, the return on average assets was 
decreasing. Over the period 1996 to 2004, the cumulative increase in the return 
on assets of the pension fund was only 480 percent compared to 54804 percent 
being the percentage by which the Zimbabwean dollar depreciated against the 
US dollar. The cumulative return on average assets on the pension fund's 
benefits was simply nothing compared to the cumulative depreciation of the 
Zimbabwe dollar against the US dollar. 
The situation would even be worse if the cumulative salary increase of ninety-one 
percent (refer to table 4.4) that was awarded to staff between1996 and 2004 is 
taken into account. This means that the growth in the assets of the pension fund 
was nowhere near the growth in the liabilities of the fund. It was therefore 
inescapable that shortfalls on the pension fund were going to emerge. It can 
therefore be argued that operating a DB scheme exposes the employer to 
unpredictable costs. This is so because the DB pension scheme promises to pay 
a defined amount to members even if the returns on investments of the pension 
fund are below expectations. 
The costs of operating a DB scheme emanates mostly from the fact that the 
pension benefits to be paid from a DB scheme have a retrospective effect. A 
series of examples is used below to illustrate this point. The examples will make 
extensive use of data on tables 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4. 
Take for instance an employee who joined ZRA four years prior to 2003 and was 
earning US$ 2 000 per month on 31 December 2003 when the exchange rate 
was US$1 to ZW$848. At that moment the employee's pension benefits would be 
calculated as follows: 
Basic Salary US$2 000 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 848 
Total Period of Service 48 Months 
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Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 81 408 000 (2000*848*48) or 
US$ 96 000 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 10 176 000 (81 408 000*12,5%) or 
US$ 12 000 
Assuming no annual increment in the basic salary, on 31 December 2004 (twelve 
months later), when the exchange rate moved to US$1 to ZW$ 5 139 his benefits 
would be as follows: 
Basic Salary US$2 000 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 5139 
Total Period of Service 60 Months 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 616 680 000 (2000*5139*60) or 
US$120 000 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 77 085 000 (616 680 000*12, 5%) 
US$15 000 
This equates to an increase of 658 percent on the Zimbabwe dollar amount and 
25 percent in US dollar terms over a period of one year. Of the total increase in 
the Zimbabwe dollar amount, 506 percent represents the extent to which the 
Zimbabwe dollar depreciated against the United States dollar while the 
remainder is a combination of the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar and the 
additional twelve months service. The increase on the US dollar amount is due to 
the additional 12 months employment service. 
The magnitude of the increase would be more if the general annual increment 
awarded to employees is taken into account. Take for instance the five percent 
annual salary increment awarded in 2004. The pension benefits would further be 
escalated as follows: 
Basic Salary US$2 100 (2000*1.05) 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 5139 
Total Period of Service 60 Months 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 647 514 000 (2100*5139*60) or 
US$126 000 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 80 939 250 (777 016 800*12, 5%) or 
US$ 15 750 
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The increase in benefits over the twelve months ended 31 December 2004 was 
in this case 695 percent on the Zimbabwe dollar amount and 31.25 percent on 
the US dollar amount. The huge increase on the Zimbabwe dollar amount was 
due to a combination of the change in exchange rate, an increase in the monthly 
salary and an additional twelve-month period of service. 
The magnitude of the increase would even be more if we were to assume that as 
at 31 December 2003 the employee had five years of employment service with 
Zambezi River Authority. The following pension benefits would be payable to the 
member on 31 December 2003 
Basic Salary US$2 000 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 848 
Total Period of Service 60 Months 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 101 760 000 (2000*848*60) or 
US$ 120 000 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 12 720 000 (101 760 000*12, 5%) or 
US$ 15 000 
On 31 December 2004, with an annual salary increment of 5% and a change in 
exchange rate the benefits will be as follows 
Basic Salary US$2 100 (2000*1.05) 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 5139 
Total Period of Service 72 Months 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 777 016 800 (2100*5139*72) or 
US$151 200 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 116 552 520 (777 016 800*15%) or 
US$ 22 680 
In this case the increase in pension benefits over a period of one year would be 
a whopping 816 percent in Zimbabwe dollar terms and a high of 51.2 percent on 
the US dollar amount. The increase was due to a combination of reasons stated 
above as well as the fact that the percentage applied to the aggregate basic 
salary increases as the number of years of service increases. 
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Generally for every three years that an employee stays with Zambezi River 
Authority, the percentage factor that has to be applied to his aggregate basic 
salary increases by two and half percent. Back to our example, the increase in 
pension benefits could actually be higher if the presumed employee in the 
example gets a promotion during the year since his salary would be higher than 
the US$2100 above. 
A further analysis of what actually happened to the benefits of a member of the 
ZRA pension fund from 1996 to 2004 can be illustrated by the same example. In 
this analysis the cumulative annual salary increases of 91.2 percent in US dollar 
terms, awarded to members, over the period 1996 to 2004 will be taken into 
account. The same example as above will be used this time with the assumption 
that on 31 December 1996 the employee had five years of service to ZRA but 
earning US$ 2 000 per month. His pension benefits would be as follows: 
Basic Salary US$2 000 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 9.36 
Total Period of Service 60 Months 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$ 1 123 200 (2000*9.36*60) or 
US$ 120 000 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$ 140 400 (1 123 200*12, 5%) or 
US$15 000 
However on 31 December 2004 (96 months later) the same employee's pension 
benefits would be as follows: 
Basic Salary US$3 824 (2000*1.91) 
Exchange Rate US$1 to ZW$ 5139 
Total Period of Service 156 Months (60+96) 
Aggregate Basic Salary Earned ZW$3 065 639 616 (3824*5139*156) or 
US$ 596 544 
Accrued Pension Benefit ZW$766 409 904 (3 065 639 616*25%) or 
US$ 149 136 
The employee in the above example would have his pension benefits increased 
by a staggering 545 776 percent on the Zimbabwe dollar amount and 894 
percent on the US dollar amount over a period of eight years. Like in the previous 
example above the reasons for the increase in benefits is a result of the increase 
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in the length of service, the annual salary increases, the fact that the pension 
benefit has a retrospective effect and the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar 
against the US dollar. 
Assuming that over the period 1996 to 2004 no ZRA employee left the 
organization, and that no employee joined ZRA, the pension's assets needed to 
have grown at the same magnitude as the accrued benefits to members, i.e. 
545 776 percent on the Zimbabwe dollar amount or 894 percent on the US dollar 
amount. The growth should come from the investment returns and the monthly 
contributions that both the employer and the employee make. However the 
545 776 percent growth that is needed for the assets to match the growth of the 
pension fund's obligations is no mean growth rate, even for an economy like 
Zimbabwe's, whose annual inflation rate is over one hundred percent. 
It can be concluded that such a growth rate was never going to be achieved as 
no investment portfolio could have matched such a phenomenal growth in 
whatever economy the ZRA Pension Fund could have been operating in. The 
employer (ZRA) was always going to be called upon from time to time to plug the 
holes in the pension fund's finances. 
Even though the Balance Sheet of the ZRA Pension Fund does not show this, 
this is the potential growth in obligations that the fund faced. Since no investment 
could have brought in the kind of return required to offset the growth in 
obligations, the employer remains liable. It is beyond doubt that the employer 
with its limited sources of revenue would not have been able to fund such huge 
pension obligations, as discussions below would show. 
Having analysed the scenario using hypothetical examples, it is now time to turn 
to the situation at ZRA Pension Fund. The Balance Sheet at 31 December 1996, 
shows that the accrued benefits for members amounted to 26, 621 million 
Zimbabwe dollars; this amount had grown to 123.7 billion Zimbabwe dollars by 
2004. This is despite the fact that an amount of 1.725 billion Zimbabwe dollars 
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had been paid out as pension benefits. This means that from 1996 to 2004 the 
assets of ZRA Pension Fund should have grown by 52800 percent in order to 
meet pension payouts and members' accumulated benefits. On the other hand, 
investments on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange would only have yielded the ZRA 
Pension Fund an accumulated growth of 12420 percent over the same period. 
ZRA as the sponsoring organization is supposed to bridge this gap. It is therefore 
evident that the structure of the pension benefits offered by the ZRA Pension 
Fund may not be sustainable. 
5.4 The Pension Fund's Investments and their Returns 
The rules of the ZRA Pension Fund provide for the monthly payments of pension 
contributions by both the employer and the members. As in any other pension 
fund, the contributions are to be put in interest or return bearing investment 
portfolios in order to be able to eventually pay members' pension benefits when 
they fall due. The essence of making periodic pension contributions and investing 
them is that such contributions together with their return should be able to meet 
pension benefits as and when they are payable. 
The graph in figure 5.1 below shows how over the period 1996 to 2004, the 
inflation rate, the exchange rate of the Zimbabwe dollar to the US dollar and the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) Indexes have moved. The graph taken 
together with table 5.2, shows that most of the investments portfolios in which the 
ZRA Pension Fund was investing in were bringing in negative returns. Their 
yields were below the rate at which the Zimbabwe dollar was depreciating 
against the US dollar. The graph also shows what the weighted average return 
on prescribed assets and what the average return on the ZRA Pension Fund's 
investments were over the same period. 
The graph shows that from 1996, the Zimbabwe dollar has been depreciating 
against the US dollar, reaching a peak of 506 percent during the year 2004. On a 
cumulative basis since 1996, the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated against the US 
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dollar by 277 271 percent, from ZWD9.36 to USD1 in 1996 to ZWD26001 to 
USD1 by August 2005. For the ZRA Pension Fund this means that the average 
Figure 5.1 Percentage Increases in Inflation, ZRA Exchange Rates, Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange Indices And Average Return on Assets of the 
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return on its assets had to match the percentage depreciation of the Zimbabwe 
dollar to the US dollar. What is even worse for the ZRA pension fund and indeed 
other defined benefit pension funds is that the nature of the benefit to be paid has 
a retrospective effect. Since the benefit to be paid out is based on the final 
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aggregate salary, and since the salaries of ZRA employees are quoted in the US 
dollar and paid in the local currency, each time the local currency depreciates 
against the US dollar, this causes the accrued benefit to increase by at least the 
magnitude of the depreciation as was shown in the previous paragraphs. 
The graph shows that throughout the period under review (1996 to 2004), the 
average return on the Pension Fund's assets was far below the rate at which the 
Zimbabwe dollar was depreciating against the US dollar. On a cumulative basis, 
from 1996 to 2004 the average return on assets grew by a mere 480 percent 
against 54 804 percent by which the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated against the US 
dollar over the same period. This clearly shows that at the rate at which assets 
were growing, they were never going to match the rate at which liabilities were 
shooting up. 
In the US many pension plans invest between 60 to 80 percent of their assets in 
the equities market (Mitchell 2004) because of the potential return the equities 
market has. If the ZRA Pension Fund had followed the example of other pension 
plans in the US, it would have invested a significant portion of its assets in the 
Zimbabwean Stock Exchange (ZSE). The graph in Figure 5.1 clearly shows that 
it was only in 1997, 1999 and 2000 that the average return on assets of the ZRA 
Pension Fund out-performed the growth in the ZSE industrial index. In the other 
six years under consideration, the growth in the ZSE industrial index was far 
greater than the average return on assets. The graph can also be shown in the 
form of a table as depicted in table 5.2. The table (5.2) shows that on a 
cumulative basis from 1996 to 2004 the industrial index of the ZSE grew by 
12420 percent compared to 480 percent by which the average return on pension 
investments grew over the same period. This represents a growth rate of more 
than twenty five times of what was achieved by the ZRA Pension Fund. 
Apart from the capital growth of shares of the counters listed on the ZSE, most, if 
not all, of the companies listed on the ZSE were declaring dividends. From the 
foregoing it is clear that the ZRA Pension Fund would have realized more returns 
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by investing on the ZSE than it did elsewhere. It was only in the year 2000 that 
the pension fund invested on the ZSE registered counters, even then the amount 
invested was only1.5 percent of the total assets of the pension fund. It can 
therefore be said that the choice of investments portfolios contributed to the low 
returns that the pension fund was getting from its investments. Table 5.3 below 
shows the composition of the ZRA pension fund's investments. 
As can be seen from table 5.3 below the bulk of the investments of the pension 
fund were in the short-term money market deposits from 1996 to 2001. Investing 
the bulk of the pension fund's assets in the money market could have helped in 
dealing with the short-term volatility of the stock market. However the period of 
focus of a pension fund's investment is long term as such short term swings 
should have been of less concern to the trustees. The ZRA Pension Fund 
initially, enjoyed high interest rates compared to inflation on these short-term 
deposits, particularly in 1995 and 1996 when interest rates were above inflation. 
However, money market investments, which are short-term investments, are not 
suitable for a pension fund (Mitchell 2000). 
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Source: Compiled from the ZRA Pension Fund Annual Accounts 1996 
to 2004 
The ZRA Pension Rules allow the trustees to invest as much as twenty five 
percent of the value of the assets in real estate, but the trustees steered clear of 
such an investment option. It was not until 1999 when the trustees decided to 
invest in growth assets such as real estate and later in 2000 when they ventured 
into the equities market. Even when the trustees did invest in growth assets the 
amounts that were being invested were too insignificant to make a significant 
impact on the returns of the fund's investments. 
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To date, the ZRA Pension Fund has only invested in four real estates all of which 
are residential properties whose growth is not as phenomenal as commercial or 
industrial properties. It can therefore be argued that failure by the trustees to 
invest part of the fund's assets in growth assets helped in constraining the 
investment returns of the fund. Apart from the capital growth of the assets in the 
form of appreciation of asset values, the fund would also have reaped rewards in 
the form of rentals receivable from these properties. 
Having noted the failure by the trustees of the ZRA pension fund to invest in 
growth assets such as equities and property, it is necessary to compare the 
growth of such investments with the growth in liabilities of the fund. Table 5.2 and 
Figure 5.1 would show that the ZSE industrial index grew at a lower rate than the 
obligations of the fund. Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 show that it was only for the 
years 1996, 1999 and 2001 that the percentage increase in the ZSE industrial 
index was higher than the percentage increase in the exchange rates. In the 
other six years the magnitude of the percentage increase of the change in 
exchange rates was much higher than the percentage increase in the industrial 
index of the ZSE. 
Table 5.2 show that the cumulative increase in the movement of the ZSE 
industrial index from 1996 to 2004 was 12 420 percent while from 1996 to 
October 2005 it was 152 434 percent. This may sound an impressive growth. 
However, if it were to be compared with a cumulative depreciation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar of 54 804 percent from 1996 to 2004 and 277 688 for the 
period 1996 to October 2005 the growth in the ZSE industrial index becomes 
inadequate in meeting obligations of the pension fund. This means that in a 
space of nine years, the exchange rate moved almost three times as much as 
the indices of the investment portfolio in which the ZRA Pension Fund could have 
obtained the highest return on its investments. Even if the trustees had invested 
the entire assets of the ZRA Pension Fund on the ZSE, they were not going to 
get a return that could have covered for the magnitude of the increase in the 
exchange rates. Being unable to match the returns of the pension fund to the 
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depreciation of the local currency meant that pension shortfalls were going to 
arise. From the above analysis, pension shortfalls were arising due to the 
structural design of the ZRA Pension Fund benefits. It can therefore be argued 
that pension promises of the ZRA Pension Fund were too large and unaffordable 
given the investment environment in Zimbabwe. 
5.5 Late Remittance of Pension Shortfalls 
According to the ZRA pension rules, Section 17 (3), quarterly accounts should be 
produced, showing the aggregate accrued benefits of all members of the pension 
fund and the total assets of the fund. If the accrued benefits exceed the total 
assets of the fund, the employer should make good the shortfall. The Pension 
and Provident Fund Act of Zimbabwe Section 17 (1) also require that a DB 
pension scheme should be valued every three years by a registered actuary. In 
line with this provision of the Zimbabwean law, the ZRA Pension Fund was being 
actuarially valued from time to time. 
According to an actuarial report of the pension fund that was prepared as at 30 
June 1995 the assets of the fund were more than sufficient to cover for the 
accrued benefits of members as at that date. The assets were 102 percent of the 
accrued benefits (Watson Wyatt 1996). Another actuarial report prepared as at 
31 December 2000 showed that the assets of the fund had dwindled to seventy-
two percent of the liabilities of the fund (Pentact Limited 2001). Yet another 
valuation carried out as at 30 June 2004 showed that the assets of the fund 
constituted only twenty-two percent of the liabilities of the fund (Penact Limited 
2004). The employer, as per the rules of the fund was supposed to increase its 
funding of the pension scheme. However, the employer was not always able to 
make good the shortfalls as is illustrated below. 
The balance sheet of the pension fund shows that as at the end of 1996, only 
three percent (US$ 71 795) of the assets of the fund was in the form of 
contributions due from the employer. The figure had grown to seventy percent of 
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the assets of the fund (US$ 1 686 740) by the end of 2004, having at one time 
reached seventy-seven percent. Judging from the increase in outstanding 
contributions, it could be said that the employer was increasingly finding it 
difficult to pay pension contributions. The outstanding contributions from the 
employer were not attracting any interest. It could therefore be said the employer 
was partly responsible for overall low returns that the pension fund was realizing 
on its assets. The use of a table will better illustrate how outstanding 
contributions were increasing from year to year. 
Table 5.4 below shows how the employer was increasingly finding it difficult to 
continue funding the pension fund. 
Table 5.4 Contributions Receivable 1996 to 2004 
Source Compiled from ZRA Pension Fund Annual Accounts 1996 to 
2004 
The table shows that by 2003, pension fund contributions outstanding from the 
employer had become the biggest single asset of the pension fund. It can be 
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argued that if the em: :>yer was timeously funding the pension fund the returns 
to be realized from t* e jnd's investments were going to be much higher than 
has been the case. However, the employer may argue that the amounts it had 
to pay to the pension scheme were too high. The amounts were mainly a result 
of the benefit structure of the pension fund as illustrated in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
The delays by the employer to pay up pension shortfalls have a bearing on the 
continued operation of the pension fund. If for some reason the pension 
members who are entitled to the fifteen highest pension benefits were to leave 
the employment services of ZRA, and the employer is not able to pay for the 
pension benefits, then the pension fund will have to disinvest from all its 
investments to be able to pay. Table 5.5 below shows 15 employees who have 
accumulated the highest pension entitlements. The exact names have been 
concealed for confidentiality reasons. 
From table 5.5 below the total accumulated pension benefits for the 15 members 
was ZW$ 4 459 000 000 as at the end of 2004 whereas the total investments 
(excluding outstanding contributions) of the ZRA pension fund was 
ZW$3 698 603 000, (see Balance Sheet under table 4.6. The total investments 
of the fund were only able to cover for the benefits of about twelve members 
(with the highest accumulated benefits) of the pension fund out of a total 
membership of one hundred and forty. This shows how precarious the situation 
is for the pension fund. If nothing is done the ZRA pension fund may collapse. 
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Table 5.5 Members with Highest Accrued Benefits as at 31 December 
2004 
Source ZRA Pension Fund Financial Statements 2004 p 12 
5.6 Prescribed Assets 
The low returns on the investments of the fund could be attributed to many 
factors. One such factor is the pension legislation in Zimbabwe. As alluded to in 
Chapter Four, the Pensions and Provident Fund Act of Zimbabwe, Section 18 
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(2a) stipulates that forty-five percent of the assets of any pension fund should be 
invested in prescribed assets. 
Table 5.2 shows that the weighted average return on prescribed assets, which 
the pension fund invested in, ranged between twenty and sixty-eight percent per 
annum for the years 1996 to 2004. Though the weighted average return on 
prescribed assets was higher than the average return on total assets, the return 
on these investments was too low compared to other investment options. On a 
cumulative basis, the return on the prescribed assets for the period 1996 to 2004 
was a 973 percent compared to 54 804 percent for the depreciation of the ZW 
dollar against the US dollar over the same period, (see table 5.2). The only time 
that the weighted average return on these investments exceeded the percentage 
increase on the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar against the US dollar was 
in 1996, 1999 and 2001. 
Prescribed assets could have the advantage that their returns are less volatile 
than the returns on equity investments (Davis 2000) but the scenario in table 5.2 
shows that they are very susceptible to increases in inflation. Some of the 
prescribed assets in which the ZRA Pension Fund invested in, are long term, 
their interest rates fixed and the principal is to be repaid at face value. As an 
example some of the City of Bulawayo stocks that were purchased in 1996 and 
were to mature between 2005 and 2012 had very low interest rates (see 
Appendix I). At the time of purchase, interest rates of between 20 and 25 percent 
were relatively attractive as inflation was around 21 percent (see table 5.2) and 
predictions were that it was going to fall to single digits. However, inflation did 
not fall; instead it picked up to reach a peak of 623 percent in January 2004. This 
meant that the pension fund assets had been tied in investments which were 
yielding negative returns and these assets could not be redeemed until maturity, 
some years later. 
The prescribed assets were purchased mostly because legislation required that 
a certain percentage of a registered pension fund had to be invested in these 
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kinds of assets. The issue of prescribed assets compels pension funds to invest 
huge sums of their assets in non-performing investments causing pension 
shortfalls for DB schemes. It can therefore be argued that the law on prescribed 
assets contributed to the low returns that the ZRA pension fund was getting from 
its investment and as a result shortfalls on the pension fund arose. The situation 
could have been made worse by the choice of long term investments which 
appeared as good buys but as events later confirmed they were not good buys 
after all. 
5.7 Foreign investments 
According to the Pensions and Provident Act of Zimbabwe, Section 18(1) all 
investments of the pension fund have to be invested in the Zimbabwean 
currency and within Zimbabwe. This means that amounts of the pension fund 
should be maintained in the Zimbabwean currency and only invested in the 
Zimbabwean currency within Zimbabwe. This creates a problem for the ZRA 
Pension Fund in that the salaries of the employees of the Zambezi River 
Authority are quoted in US dollars and paid in the local currency at the ruling 
rate. However, in accordance with the Zimbabwean law, investments cannot be 
held in any other currency other than the Zimbabwean dollar. 
The fact that the salaries of ZRA employees are quoted in the US dollar means 
that the ZRA Pension Fund is exposed to currency risk. This calls for the 
management of currency risk, for instance by matching assets (investments) and 
liabilities (members' pension) in the same currency. If the trustees of the ZRA 
pension fund were to manage the currency risk to reasonable levels they would 
have invested quite a significant portion of the assets of the pension fund in 
assets denominated in US dollars. However, the Zimbabwean law took this 
option away from the trustees. 
Investing some of the assets of the fund was not only going to hedge the fund 
against currency fluctuations but was also going to be part of the diversification 
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strategy of the fund. For a pension fund operating in Zimbabwe, with its high 
inflation and associated political risk, investing outside the country would have 
provided greater diversification benefits than investing only in Zimbabwe. This is 
so because events obtaining in a developing country (like Zimbabwe) have a 
lesser bearing on events, say, in developed countries (Buckley 2000). However, 
this specific provision of the Zimbabwean laws means that the ZRA Pension 
Fund cannot hedge its investments against currency fluctuations though 
currency fluctuations is the biggest risk that the fund faces. 
The laws in Zimbabwe do not also allow any forward cover transaction of any 
sort to be undertaken. It can therefore be said as far as managing the currency 
risk is concerned, the hands of the trustees are tied by legislation. Some may 
however argue that even if the trustee's hands were not tied the effect of 
hedging was going to be limited given that the ZRA Pension Fund has a small 
asset base. It can however be said that international portfolio diversification 
would have yielded for the ZRA Pension Fund an improved risk-return pay-off. 
5.8 Pension Contributions 
The rules of the ZRA Pension Fund provide for the payment of monthly pension 
contributions by the employer as well as the employee. For the latter, the 
contribution rates are pegged at two and half percent of the employee's basic 
salary. The table below shows the contribution of each income source to the 
total income of the ZRA Pension Fund 
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Table 5.6 Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund 
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Source Compiled from ZRA Pension Fund Financial Statements 1996 to 2004 
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As table 5.6 above shows, contribution by members over the years was less 
than one percent of the total income of the pension fund. In contrast, 
contributions by the employer ranged between a low of 41.73 percent to a high 
of 91.5 percent of total income. This shows that contributions by members are 
very negligible. Given that members are supposed to be saving for their 
retirement through these contributions, the percentage of what they contribute to 
the total income makes a mockery of the whole setup. 
Pension contributions by members in Zimbabwe are generally lower than those 
in the EU average of between 7.5 and 12.5 percent of a member's basic salary 
(Wallace 2002). If contributions were to be pegged at a higher rate, certainly 
higher than the contributions currently being made, contributions by members 
would constitute a more significant source of income of the ZRA Pension Fund. 
More significantly if pension contributions were seen by members to be taking a 
significant portion of their income, members would most likely take interest in the 
management of the pension fund. 
Currently, the employer contributes almost all of the ZRA Pension Fund's 
income as such employees take a back seat in the management of the pension 
fund. Trustees can therefore get away with mediocre returns on the investments 
of the fund. It has to be emphasized here that ZRA is a quasi-government entity 
and as such the pressure that is applied by the employer on the management of 
the pension fund is less than what would have been the case were ZRA a 
private or public company owned by shareholders. 
5.9 Management of the Fund and Composition of Trustees 
A principal officer of the pension fund who is supervised by mostly an elected 
board of trustees runs the ZRA Pension Fund. The principal officer has other 
duties as an employee of ZRA and is not well trained in the field of pension 
management nor is he a professional in the field of finance. The principal officer 
makes all investment decisions. On a day-to-day basis the principal officer 
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makes all investment decisions. It has been shown in the discussions above that 
if appropriate investment decisions had been made, the ZRA Pension Fund 
would have been in a better position than it is currently in. Part of the reasons for 
the wrong investment decisions emanate from use of untrained persons. 
The principal officer is not the only one who is not trained in treasury functions 
but the board of trustees as a whole. The composition of the trustees leaves a lot 
to be desired. Apart from the Finance Director of ZRA who is the chairman of the 
board of trustees, members popularly elect other trustees every three years. Like 
most popular elections, the election of ZRA Pension Fund trustees is not always 
won by members well versed in pension administration. Having trustees who are 
not well versed in pension administration presiding over pension issues would 
result in inappropriate decisions being made. It can also be said that since 
members know that any shortfalls on the pension fund are the responsibility of 
the employer, they are not much worried about the performance of the trustees 
they elect. If pension shortfalls were to be the members' responsibility it is most 
probable that things could have been different. 
5.10 Conclusion 
Setting up of a pension fund to provide for the financial security of its employees 
was a commendable act on the part of Zambezi River Authority, more so in a 
country where an employer is under no obligation to do so. However, the setting 
up of the pension fund was just one step; more was to be done in terms of the 
funding, the benefit structure and the management. Going by the presentation 
above telltale signs are there that the ZRA Pension Fund may collapse if nothing 
is done to arrest the decline. The next chapter makes recommendations on what 
can be done to stem the tide. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
The Zambezi River Authority Pension Fund was set up when the membership to 
the fund was just a handful. The few employees, who joined had accumulated 
small amounts as pension benefits. The economy then was very stable and there 
were not many financial demands placed upon the employer. The employer had 
the capacity to finance the fund without any problem. 
The previous chapters illustrated that the following changes took place over the 
years: 
• Employees who were not eligible to be members when the fund was set 
up have been admitted as members. 
• Members have accumulated substantial pension benefits having been in 
the company for several years. 
• The Zimbabwean economy has not been performing as well as it should 
and with it the value of the Zimbabwean dollar has crashed against the 
US dollar. 
All these factors conspire to present huge challenges to the ZRA pension fund. 
If nothing is done the pension fund is likely to collapse. From the previous 
chapter it would seem that a lot could be done to save the pension fund from 
certain collapse. This chapter will recommend that the defined benefit structure of 
the pension fund should be changed to a defined contribution, the investment 
portfolios of the ZRA pension should be diversified, member contributions should 
be increased and the management of the pension fund itself need to be 
revamped. 
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6.2 Structure of the Defined Fund 
The previous chapter dealt with what could have gone wrong with the ZRA 
Pension Fund. More than anything else it was shown that the structural design of 
the pension benefit under the Defined Benefit Scheme was responsible for the 
pension shortfalls. The experience in the West as shown in Chapter Two of this 
presentation indicated that Defined Benefit schemes are no longer sustainable. It 
could also be argued that if Defined Benefit funds are no longer sustainable in 
developed countries, they can not be sustainable in poorer countries such as 
Zimbabwe which has very limited resources, limited investment options and 
whose economy is shrinking. 
The previous chapter showed that Zimbabwe does not have investment options 
which could have matched the rate at which ZRA Pension Fund benefits were 
accruing. If investment returns cannot match the growth in obligations it means 
the employer has to periodically pump in additional funding into the pension fund 
if the fund is to be saved from collapse. 
In the case of Zambezi River Authority, the previous chapter alluded to the fact 
that the low returns on investments that were being realized were due to many 
factors including the delay by the employer to timeously pay up the due amounts. 
Adding additional amounts to be paid by the employer would only worsen the 
plight of the employer and may in the end lead to the employer having to declare 
bankruptcy. This would not in any way help anybody, let alone the members of 
the pension fund who are themselves employees of ZRA. 
As has already been pointed out in this presentation, the DB pension scheme 
was the scheme of first choice but since the 1980's DC schemes have become 
critically important mechanisms for retirement provisions. Most companies 
wishing to set up pension funds for their employees now opt for defined 
contribution type of pension schemes; even those with DB schemes are 
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changing in droves to DC plans, as has been the case particularly in the US and 
the UK. 
This has also been the case in Zimbabwe where a number of companies, 
realizing the extent to which they are indebted to their pension funds, have 
decided to change from a DB scheme to a DC scheme. As much as ninety 
pension schemes changed from DC to DB schemes in the last two years 
(Zimbabwe Association of Pension Funds Bulletin Issue No. 2 of 2005). There 
are quite a number of explanations for the trend as mentioned in this 
presentation. 
Probably the most appealing advantage of the DB pension scheme to the 
members is its potential to provide a stable income for members when they reach 
retirement age, while capital market and longevity risks are taken care of by the 
employer (Li 2003). However events of the past decade or two have shown that 
this is only a potential, which in practical cases may remain unfulfilled (Mitchell 
2002). Most DB pension schemes have been shown to be under-funded. This is 
the situation that the ZRA finds itself in whereby its pension fund for Zimbabwean 
nationals is funded only to the tune of twenty-two percent. It could be of no use 
for the members to hold on to a promise for a pension, which is unlikely to be 
fulfilled. It could be better for employees to switch to a fully funded pension 
scheme where they are assured of their pension than stick to one which 
promises to offer so much, and in the end may deliver nothing. In Zimbabwe, if a 
pension scheme is under funded the loss falls on the members, unlike in the US 
where the employers insure against DB schemes' under funding. 
As the literature review section of this presentation showed, there is not much to 
choose from in terms of the welfare of members, between the DB and the DC 
pension schemes. Samwich and Skinner (as quoted by Li 2003) also found out 
that the realization of earnings and asset returns were identical for each worker 
in both schemes. Based on these researches it would be better for ZRA and 
indeed members of the ZRA pension fund for the pension fund to be changed 
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from a DB to a DC pension scheme. The advantage to the employer would be 
that the costs of pension contributions would be known and manageable. The 
advantage to the members is that they will receive a pension upon retirement 
and not a promissory note as is likely to happen if the ZRA pension scheme is 
not reformed. 
Once a pension scheme has been formed and pension rules put in place, they 
are not cast in stone. Circumstances are bound to change and so should the 
rules, if the pension scheme is to remain relevant. The ZRA pension scheme 
should therefore move with the times in order to survive. In amending the existing 
rules of the ZRA Pension Fund, affordability to the employer is cardinal; this is 
exactly what the Defined Contribution scheme offers. 
Before any changes to the pension rules can be made, observance of the law is 
important. The Statutory Instrument 119 of 1995 (Section 39), of the laws of 
Zimbabwe, which governs the conditions of service of ZRA employees only 
states that the Authority shall operate a pension scheme. It does not specify what 
type of pension plan ZRA should adopt. The choice of a pension plan in terms of 
design and benefit structure seems to have been left to the employer. In making 
that decision, it is imperative for ZRA to take into account its financial ability to 
meet the pension contributions to the new scheme. It would appear, therefore, 
that it is possible for the employer to change from the defined benefit plan to a 
defined contribution plan. However, there is still a process to follow when 
changing from one pension fund benefit to another as enunciated by the Pension 
and Provident Fund Act, Section 8 of the laws of Zimbabwe. 
The process to be followed includes dissolving the DB scheme and applying for 
registration of the new DC scheme. Legal advice needs to be obtained before 
ZRA proceeds to change the structure of the pension fund. Consultations would 
also need to be held with employees explaining the reasons behind the change 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two schemes. 
83 
6.3 Alternative Investment Options 
It is important to note that the most important factor affecting the finances of the 
fund is inflation. In the case of the ZRA Pension Scheme, inflation manifests itself 
through the depreciation of the local currency against the US dollar. Pension 
benefits to be paid are based on the highest annual salary, which has been 
without exception the salary immediately before retirement, withdrawal or death. 
The ability of the fund to finance these benefits out of contributions received 
depends solely on its ability to achieve a rate of return which at least matches the 
growth of its liabilities. 
The previous chapter has shown that a significant portion of the ZRA Pension 
Fund's investments have been in the form of volatile money market deposits. 
While the ZRA Pension Fund could have periodically enjoyed high interest rates 
on these investment types, short-term investment options are not suitable for a 
pension fund whose planning horizon is long term (Davis 2000). In the case of 
Zimbabwe it has always been expected that while there could be brief periods 
when interest rates would be high, the rates would decrease in the medium to 
long term. It would therefore be prudent for trustees to use some of the Fund's 
cash assets to buy long-term investments. Trustees should consider investing 
some of the monies in growth assets such as equities and properties or even 
property development as such investments better match the real liabilities of the 
fund. 
Long-term investment options may have a high risk of being illiquid and volatile, 
but the market may compensate investors for those risks by a higher return than 
what could be obtainable from the money market (Davis 2000). Investment in 
property can protect assets during market downturns and from inflation thereby 
ensuring capital appreciation over the long term. A report by Knight Frank in 
2004 revealed that the majority of office space in Harare was dilapidated due to 
lack of maintenance (www.kniqhtfrank.com). This lack of quality stock and 
congestion in the city center presents an opportunity for pension schemes such 
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as the ZRA one to build offices in suburban locations. Other than the returns and 
the capital appreciation, investing in such assets as property development would 
ensure a relatively low correlation with investment in the money markets. 
Investing in alternative investments can reduce the overall risk of the pension 
fund's investment portfolio and thus enhance the risk adjusted return (Buckley 
2000). It should also be acknowledged here that the Zimbabwean capital market 
is not as advanced as the ones obtaining in developed countries. As such there 
is a limit to which the trustees could go in search of alternative investment 
options. However, even in the context of limited long-term investment options 
obtaining in Zimbabwe, the ZRA Pension Fund can do much more than investing 
the bulk of its assets in the money market. The trustees will need to consider the 
liquidity, limitations on transferability and uneven patterns of returns of the 
alternative investment options before they invest. 
6.4 Management of the Pension Fund 
The present set up of the ZRA Pension Fund is that it is self-administered with its 
only employee being the principal pensions officer. All the decisions are made by 
the trustees who themselves are not at all professionals in the field nor have they 
received training on pension administration. This is not healthy for the ZRA 
Pension Fund. The selection of performing investment portfolios has been a 
major problem mainly because of the shortage of expertise in the field of 
investments. It would therefore be in the interest of both the employer and the 
members to contract out the management of the ZRA Pension Fund to 
professional pension managers who perform similar services elsewhere for other 
pension funds. It should be noted that assets of the fund need to be invested in 
performing investments because if the long term investments returns turn out to 
be lower than the long term increase in staff salaries the DC scheme will offer 
lower retirement benefits than a similar version of the DB scheme. It is important 
for the sake of the employees that experienced personnel in Fund Management 
are appointed to manage the scheme. 
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The other aspect of investment managers is that they provide a means for funds 
to participate in the property market by arranging for a number of funds to have 
shares in a particular property in cases where none of the funds would be large 
enough to buy that property outright (Pentact Limited 2001). This arrangement 
allows funds to diversify their property investments. As long as the legal 
arrangements on joint ownership are worked out with fund managers, this is an 
acceptable way for the ZRA Pension Fund to participate in property investments. 
This could be very advantageous for the ZRA Pension Fund, which is a relatively 
small pension fund and on its own may not have the financial muscle to fully 
participate in what is potentially a lucrative Zimbabwean property market. 
The downside of this investment option is that these growth assets do not have 
capital guarantee and their market values fluctuate from time to time. However 
when carefully chosen, in the longer term the returns on such investments will 
ordinarily exceed those which could have been realized on fixed interest stocks, 
and/or deposits. The trustees will need to take this into account in making 
decisions. It will be important for them to take expert advice before investing in a 
particular share or property to make sure all the loose ends are tightened. 
Changing from a DB to a DC and appointing professional pension managers 
would not solve all the problems the ZRA Pension Fund is facing. Trustees and 
indeed members still need to play their part. The trustees of the ZRA Pension 
Fund have been operating with no documented investment strategies and no 
investment targets or benchmarks for the pension fund. There was therefore no 
basis on which to measure the performance of the fund. This has to change if the 
ZRA Pension Fund has to find its feet again. The trustees need to come up with 
a properly formulated investment strategy and the attendant targets. This may 
call for the trustees going for relevant courses to arm themselves with necessary 
skills to properly give policy direction to the fund. This will obviously cost money 
but it could be money well spent if the ZRA Pension Fund is turned around. The 
members of the fund have to demand performance from their representatives, 
the trustees. 
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The members of the ZRA Pension Scheme on their part have been disinterested 
onlookers, not taking active steps to ensure that their investments are not eroded 
by inflation. Members need to play their part by ensuring that the persons they 
elect to be trustees have the skills and drive to ensure that their contributions are 
invested in high yielding investments. Trustees should be able to do this by 
taking expert advice, even at the cost of the pension fund. 
6.5 Member Contributions 
On average member contributions being made by pension funds in Zimbabwe 
ranges from about 7.5 percent of a member's basic salary to about 12.5 percent 
(Zimbabwe Association of Pension Funds 2003). However in the case of ZRA the 
member contributions are quite low at two and half percent of a member's basic 
salary. The main purpose of a pension fund is to secure financial security of 
pensioners by keeping benefits stable over time. Pension benefits are important 
and of concern to all workers as in each member's life, a time will come when he 
will have to rely on pension payouts for livelihood. It is therefore important for 
every worker to make an important contribution towards his or her pension. This 
will call for the upward review of pension contributions being made by ZRA 
pension fund members to a more realistic level of, say, at least 7.5 percent of 
basic salary. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This presentation has highlighted the problems being faced in running the ZRA 
Pension Scheme. The biggest problem is the benefit structure of the pension 
fund. It has to be realized that the pension fund was established when the 
members of the pension fund were very few and relatively young and therefore 
the benefit structure could have been appropriate. Over the years, the fund has 
since grown, the members have accumulated substantial benefits and the macro-
economic fundamentals of Zimbabwe have significantly changed. 
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The employer is now struggling to meet its obligations to the pension fund. At the 
rate at which pension shortfalls are being realized, the employer will not be able 
to meet the pension shortfalls. That will spell doom for the ZRA Pension Fund 
and indeed the lives of the present day ZRA employees who were looking 
forward to a deserved rest in retirement. 
It is however a good thing that most of the problems being faced are well within 
the control of both the employer and the members. What is needed is to reform 
the ZRA Pension Fund. It is important for the sake of the members that the 
problems that should be corrected are fixed now otherwise the fund may 
collapse. Some of the problems facing the pension fund are beyond the control of 
the employer and the members. Such problems can only be referred to trustees 
to continue to lobby the government for it to pass legislation that is friendly to the 
running of pension funds. For instance, trustee could lobby government to reduce 
or altogether eliminate the prescribed asset ratio and to authorize pension funds 
to invest at least a percentage of the assets of pension funds offshore. The other 
factor which is beyond the control of the trustees is the improvement in the 
economic fundamentals of the Zimbabwean economy. For this and related 
factors the trustees and indeed members can only wait in hope. 
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